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 Abstract 
Social learning has given us insight into how children learn actions from others 
across different domains (e.g., actions on objects, pretend play, and tool use). However, 
little research exists to confirm whether young children can generate their own novel 
actions. Three different settings were chosen to offer a varied investigation of children’s 
ability to generate novel actions: generating multiple actions with novel objects; 
generating iconic gestures in order to communicate; and generating pretend actions 
using object substitution. 
Generating multiple actions with novel objects 
The Unusual Box test was developed to investigate children’s ability to generate 
multiple actions with novel objects (Chapter 2). The Unusual Box test involves children 
playing with a wooden box that contains many different features (e.g., rings, stairs, 
strings), and five novel objects. The number of different actions performed on the box 
and with the objects (i.e., fluency) was used as a measure of their individual learning. 
Positive correlations between the fluency scores of 24 3- and 4-year-olds on the 
Unusual Box test and two existing measures of divergent thinking were found. 
Divergent thinking relates to the ability to think of multiple answers based on one 
premise. Furthermore, a large range of fluency scores indicated individual differences 
in children’s ability to generate multiple actions with novel objects.  
In addition, 16 2-year-olds were assessed on the Unusual Box test, twice two 
weeks apart, to investigate test-retest reliability and the possibility that the Unusual Box 
test could be used with children younger than 3 years. A strong positive correlation 
between the scores on the two assessments showed high test-retest reliability, while 
individual differences in fluency scores and the absence of a floor effect indicated that 
the Unusual Box test was usable in children from 2 years of age. 
 Generating iconic gestures in order to communicate 
Children’s ability to generate iconic gestures in order to communicate was 
assessed using a game to request stickers from an experimenter (N = 20, Chapter 3). In 
order to get a sticker children had to communicate to the experimenter which out of two 
objects they wanted (only one object had a sticker attached to it). Children’s use of 
speech or pointing was ineffective; therefore only generating an iconic gesture was 
sufficient to retrieve the sticker. Children generated a correct iconic gesture on 71% of 
the trials. These findings indicate that children generate their own iconic gestures in 
order to communicate; and that they understand the representational nature of iconic 
gestures, and use this in their own generation of iconic gestures. 
Generating pretend actions using object substitution 
In order to determine whether children are able to generate their own object substitution 
actions and understand the representational nature of these actions, 45 3- and 4-year-
olds were familiarized with the goal of a task through modelling actions. Children 
distinguished between the intentions of an experimenter to pretend, or try and perform a 
correct action. Children mainly imitated the pretend actions, while correcting the trying 
actions. Next, children were presented with objects for which they had to generate their 
own object substitution actions without being shown a model. When children had 
previously been shown pretend actions, children generated their own object substitution 
actions. This indicates that children generate their own object substitution actions, and 
that they understand the representational nature of these actions. An additional study 
with 34 3-year-olds, revealed no significant correlations between divergent thinking, 
inhibitory control, or children’s object substitution in a free play setting, and children’s 
ability to generate object substitution actions in the experimental setting. 
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
1.1 Learning in young children 
Children spend most of their time learning new things; through play, reading, 
studying, watching television, and so on (Hofferth & Sandberg, 2001). When children 
reach primary school age, they spend about 30 hours a week in school and many 
children take part in extra-curricular activities outside school hours (Hofferth & 
Sandberg, 2001). However, more and more emphasis is being placed on children’s 
learning and development before they go to primary school. The Curriculum for 
Excellence (Scottish Executive, 2004), the national curriculum for schools in Scotland, 
provides guidelines for children’s learning and development from the age of 3. 
Furthermore, The Statutory Framework for the Early Years Foundation Stage (The 
Department for Education, 2012) was developed especially to provide standards for 
learning and development for children from birth to five years old. The Early Years 
Foundation Stage mentions 7 learning and development requirements - communication 
and language; physical development; personal, social and emotional development; 
literacy; mathematics; understanding the world; and expressive arts and design - which 
should safeguard and promote children’s welfare. The guidelines include that teachers 
should consider individual needs and interests, thereby emphasizing that each child’s 
learning process is unique. Furthermore they encourage a child-directed teaching 
strategy, emphasizing the importance of exploration, active learning and creative 
thinking. This indicates the importance of child-directed learning, in which children 
take a lead in what they learn. 
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1.1.1 Theories of learning 
Several different theories have been proposed in the past to explain how 
children learn. According to Piaget’s theory of cognitive development (Piaget, 1952) 
children learn to organize and interpret information presented to them by creating 
cognitive frameworks or schemata. The theory of cognitive development describes two 
processes through which children learn about the world around them; through 
accommodation and assimilation. When a child is presented with information that is 
conflicting with an existing schema, the child will have to change that schema to 
account for the new information. This process is called accommodation. An example of 
accommodation is if a child believes that all animals with four legs are dogs, but then 
discovers that there are other animals which also have four legs but are not dogs. The 
child will then have to change the current schema to accommodate for the fact that 
other animals can also have four legs. Assimilation occurs when a child includes new 
information to an existing schema without having to change the schema itself. An 
example of assimilation is if a child encounters a new breed of dog that s/he has not 
seen before, and assimilates this new dog type within the current schema of what a dog 
is. When a child’s current schemata are capable of explaining the information presented 
to him/her, equilibrium is said to occur.  
Cognitive development takes place when our schemata are adjusted or new 
schemata are formed to accommodate new information presented to us. According to 
Piaget, there are four stages of cognitive development that all children go through 
during childhood. The first stage, called the sensory-motor stage, lasts approximately 
the first 18 months of life. The most important schemata children learn during this stage 
are object permanence (i.e., an object continues to exist even when it cannot be seen 
anymore) and the idea of one sensory-motor space (i.e., space becomes a single 
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objective in which all objects are situated, including one’s own body; Piaget, 1962). 
The second stage is called the pre-operational stage, and lasts up until around 7 years of 
age. Children’s play in this stage is limited by egocentrism, in the sense that they cannot 
distinguish between their own perspective and those of others. During this stage 
children learn the principle of conservation and in effect the principle of reversibility 
(i.e., if we pour water from one glass into another glass with a different shape it will 
still contain the same amount of water). In the third or concrete operational stage (until 
around 12 years) children learn to think logically about objects and events, and are able 
to classify and order objects. However, children’s cognitive development is still limited 
to objects in space, and it takes until the fourth stage, the formal operational stage, 
before they can reason on hypothesized operations (from 12 years until adulthood). 
According to the theory of cognitive development, progression to a new 
developmental stage is a prerequisite for learning. This means that learning can only 
take place when a child has reached the appropriate stage of cognitive development to 
take in the new information. The progression of a child towards the next stage in 
cognitive development can be facilitated through biological factors (maturation), 
individual experience and social learning (Piaget, 1964). Maturation refers to the 
development of the nervous system which still takes place during childhood and into 
adolescence. According to some studies the sudden increase in cognitive skills can be 
attributed to specific changes in the nervous system which occur around the same time 
(e.g., Diamond, 1990; Goldman-Rakic, 1987). In addition, physical experience with 
objects allows us to gain an understanding about characteristics of objects such as 
weight and texture, by comparing objects with different characteristics. These 
experiences can be consolidated through social transmission, e.g., physically showing 
children the characteristics of objects or educating them in another form, such as 
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through pictures or through speech. However, according to Piaget we cannot proceed to 
the next stage of development without having understood the concepts in the previous 
stages. That is, an equilibration of the schemata in the previous stage is required before 
a child can continue to a next stage. 
Piaget’s theory of cognitive development has been influential in providing a 
foundation for other learning theories. For example, the experiential learning theory 
(Kolb, 1984) draws upon the idea that learning is a process rather than an outcome as 
proposed by behavioural theories of learning (e.g., Skinner, 1948; Thorndike, 1898; 
Watson, 1913). In classical behaviourist experiments such as the Skinner box (Skinner, 
1948) and Thorndike’s puzzle box (1898), animals learned to execute certain patterns of 
behaviour to reach a goal (e.g., press a lever a certain number of times to receive food). 
From the behaviourist’s point of view learning takes place when individuals make the 
link between the individual’s own behaviour and its outcome. Kolb (1984) argues that 
when following these behavioural learning theories learning is quantified by the number 
of fixed ideas or behaviours an individual has accumulated. The experiential learning 
theory however argues that ideas are not fixed but are formed and reformed through 
experience (Kolb, 1984). Similar to Piaget’s theory, experiential learning theory 
stresses the interaction between the knowledge an individual has already acquired and 
the current environment or experience in which this knowledge is reinterpreted. 
Therefore, ideas are not quantifiable because each idea can be influenced by new 
experiences and in that sense cannot be seen as separate entities. Learning according to 
the experiential theory is the process of acquiring new knowledge, and transforming 
existing knowledge, through experience. 
Piaget’s theory of cognitive development and the experiential theory 
acknowledge children’s individual experience as well as social transmission as a source 
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of learning; however it is unclear what the specific contributions of either are in the 
process of learning. Social learning theories, such as Vygotsky’s dialectical theory 
(1934) and pedagogy theory by Csibra and Gergely (2006), provide a framework of 
how social transmission aids learning. 
Vygotsky’s dialectical theory (1934) is perceived as the main opponent to 
Piaget’s theory of cognitive development. This theory is predominantly focused on the 
importance of other people in the process of learning, also referred to as social learning. 
According to Bandura (1971), social learning encompasses both direct experience 
through observing the behaviour of others which might not necessarily have been 
intended as learning moment (e.g., observing the consequences of driving under 
influence when a drunk driver has crashed his car) as well as deliberate modelling of 
desired behaviour (e.g., showing a child how to write).  
Although Vygotsky agrees with Piaget that we learn through interacting with 
our environment, he argues that learning precedes development rather than the other 
way around. According to Vygotsky’s dialectical theory, an individual’s current state of 
development is enhanced when confronted with new tasks just out of reach of his/her 
present abilities. The gap between our current development and what we can 
accomplish with the help of others is called the zone of proximal development (ZPD). 
The ZPD is not fixed but can increase or decrease depending on the person and the task. 
This means that some children are able to perform a bigger range of tasks with help of 
more experienced others compared to other children. Learning takes place when 
children are able to perform these new tasks with the help of others. However, in 
congruence with Piaget’s theory, Vygotsky’s dialectical theory also acknowledges 
stages in development, in the sense that children cannot learn tasks which fall outside 
the ZPD until they have mastered the tasks they can learn within the ZPD. 
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Pedagogy theory (Csibra & Gergely, 2006) proposes that children have an 
innate ability to learn from other people (‘teachers’) through their understanding of 
ostensive and referential cues. Ostensive cues are behaviours which make clear that a 
teacher has the intention to teach, or if initiated by the child, the request or intention to 
learn. Examples of ostensive cues are making eye contact, and using infant-directed 
speech to address the child (Gergely, Egyed, & Király, 2007). Referential cues are 
behaviours which make clear about which object or situation of interest knowledge is 
being transferred. Examples of referential cues are pointing or shifting gaze towards the 
referent (Csibra & Gergely, 2006).  
The innate ability to understand ostensive and referential cues is hypothesized to 
be derived from the evolution of tool use (Csibra & Gergely, 2006). According to this 
theory, the first tools used by humans had a clear purpose in helping towards a specific 
goal. The connection between the use of the tool and the outcome were clear. While 
tools were initially seen as temporary utilities which were discarded when the goal was 
reached, at some point our ancestors started to keep the tools with them for later use 
such that tools obtained permanent functions. This allowed humans to search for tools 
that served a specific purpose, which led the way to creating tools that could help in 
fabricating other tools. This important change in which tools were used in chains, 
whereby the end goal cannot immediately be derived from the initial tool use, is 
hypothesised to be the reason why pedagogy and the use of ostensive and referential 
cues evolved. When the end goal of behaviour is opaque and one cannot derive the 
direct function of this behaviour from observation alone, pedagogy can help to give 
information about the goal and how the observed behaviour can lead to that specific 
goal. Once this mechanism of pedagogy was established it allowed for use outside the 
scope of tool use. Consequently it allowed for knowledge transfer as we see it today, in 
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which not only specific behaviours are being taught in order to survive, but also 
behaviours that do not seem to have a direct adaptive value, such as arbitrary 
conventions and traditions. 
Pedagogy theory acknowledges that it only focuses on a specific kind of social 
learning, i.e., the intentional knowledge transfer between two people (‘teacher’ and 
‘learner’). More specifically, pedagogy theory only focuses on transferring existing 
knowledge and does not consider behaviour that facilitates the emergence of new 
knowledge. Similarly, Vygotsky’s dialectical theory only focuses on how children learn 
through other people who convey knowledge that they already have. Therefore, this 
theory also cannot explain how new knowledge is created.  
There are two ways in which new knowledge can be created. The first way is 
when errors are made in imitating behaviour (unsuccessful imitation), by which in 
consequence a new behaviour is created or a different outcome is reached (Rendell et 
al., 2010). For example, someone may intend to use a hammer to put a nail into a wall 
as modelled but accidentally misses and consequently makes a hole in the wall. 
Although unsuccessfully imitating the initial behaviour, it does show a new way in 
which a hammer could be used, thereby adding new knowledge to the current 
knowledge repertoire. The second way in which new knowledge can be created is 
through exploration, in which new knowledge is intentionally searched for by trying out 
new behaviour (March, 1991). It includes behaviours such as experimentation, play, 
being flexible, and risk taking (March, 1991). Since exploration is an intentional 
process of knowledge creation while unsuccessful imitation is merely a by-product of 
an error, exploration is generally the focus of interest when investigating knowledge 
creation (e.g., Charney, Reder & Kusbit, 1990; Gupta, Smith & Shalley, 2006; March, 
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1991; Tani & Yamamoto, 2002). Therefore, in this thesis only exploration is considered 
when talking about processes which create new knowledge.  
Social learning theories emphasize the importance of interaction with others in 
the process of learning; however this does not provide the full picture. Learning can 
occur both in social settings as well as in non-social settings through exploration, also 
referred to as individual learning (Vriend, 2000). The theory of cultural evolution 
(Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland, 2004) provides a framework in which both the individual 
contributions of social learning and individual learning are apparent.  
In accordance with Darwin’s theory of evolution (Darwin, 1859) the theory of 
cultural evolution proposes that human cultural traits (e.g., knowledge, skills, 
behaviours) evolve over time through variation, competition, and inheritance (Mesoudi 
et al., 2004). Variation refers to the variety of cultural traits that exist. Variation 
increases when new ideas or behaviours are introduced, for example via exploration, or 
when existing traits are modified (Mesoudi et al., 2004). A variation of cultural traits is 
required to allow us to adapt to changing environments. Only those variations survive 
which are useful for our species to survive. Competition is important in this selection 
process to filter out those variations that are not viable so that only the best cultural 
traits survive. This is similar to the ‘survival of the fittest’ phenomenon in Darwin’s 
theory of evolution. Finally, inheritance takes place when cultural traits are socially 
transmitted to other people who have not learned these traits yet. Vertical transmission 
takes place when traits are transmitted from one generation to the next, while during 
horizontal transmission traits are transmitted to individuals within the same generation 
(Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981). Inheritance is crucial for cultural evolution because 
it allows us to learn from the experiences of others, which saves time and can even 
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make the difference between life and death (e.g., learning what foods are edible; Galef 
Jr & Laland, 2005).  
According to the theory of cultural evolution, both individual learning and social 
learning are important learning mechanisms. On the one hand, individual learning 
allows for the creation of new knowledge which is important to increase the variation of 
cultural traits. This allows us to adapt to new environments, and search for solutions to 
problems that might threaten our existence (e.g., climate change, disease epidemics). 
On the other hand, social learning allows for cumulative learning, in which new 
knowledge builds on and integrates existing knowledge (Maton, 2009). By combining 
social and individual learning, we are able to build upon what is known and create new 
knowledge which we most likely would not be able to produce without previous 
knowledge (e.g., specialized technologies such as the computer). This allows for 
innovation, when new ideas are introduced that result in increased performance of the 
society (Rogers, 1998). 
1.1.2 Divergent thinking, creativity, and generation of new ideas 
An important cognitive skill in the generation of new ideas is divergent 
thinking. Divergent thinking is defined as the ability to think of ideas beyond what is 
currently available and to search for new alternatives (Guilford, 1959). Terms such as 
‘brainstorming’ or ‘thinking outside the box’ are common terminologies to indicate 
divergent thinking. Divergent thinking has been argued to be an important cognitive 
skill for creativity, with high divergent thinking predicting creative achievement (e.g., 
Kim, 2006; Runco, Millar, Acar, & Cramond, 2010).  
Creativity has been defined in many different ways. For example, Perry-Smith 
& Shalley (2003) define creativity as “generating new ways to perform their work, by 
coming up with novel procedures or innovative ideas, and by reconfiguring known 
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approaches into new alternatives” (p. 90). Smith (2005) argues that a creative activity 
“must generate a valuable or, at least, appropriate product” (p. 294). Glück, Ernst 
and Unger (2002) found that creative artists themselves differ in their definition of 
what creativity is, with some artists putting more emphasis on the originality or 
unusualness of creative work, while others find functionality or usefulness more 
important. However, the general consensus of all these definitions are that creativity 
includes an element of originality or unusualness and an element of novelty or 
creation. 
Creativity is regularly assessed by the means of divergent thinking tests (e.g., 
Torrance, 1974; Torrance, 1981; Wallach & Kogan, 1965). These divergent thinking 
tests include measures of how many different ideas are generated (fluency), and how 
original the ideas are (originality). It has been found that people who can think of many 
different ideas are also more likely to think of more original ideas (e.g., Clark & Mirels, 
1970; Torrance, 2008). This suggests that the generation of ideas and producing novel 
and original (i.e., creative) ideas go hand in hand. Therefore, divergent thinking is 
argued to be an important cognitive skill in the process of individual learning to 
increase the variation of new ideas which in turn can lead to important changes to our 
knowledge repertoire. 
In the next sections, past research on social learning and individual learning in 
children is discussed. Because of the importance of these learning mechanisms for the 
cultural evolution of our species, and in accordance with the learning theories described 
above, individual and social learning are argued to be observable from a young age.  
1.1.3 Social Learning 
Many studies have looked at how children learn from the behaviours of others 
through imitation (e.g., Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Nagell, Olguin, & 
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Tomasello, 1993; Simpson & Riggs, 2011; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2013). Children 
reliably copy simple actions on objects from around 12 months (Barr, Dowden, & 
Hayne, 1996). They are not limited to vertical social transmission by imitating adults 
(e.g., Bekkering et al., 2000; Simpson & Riggs, 2011); they also imitate peers (e.g., 
Hanna & Meltzoff, 1993; Ryalls, Gul & Ryalls, 2000) allowing for horizontal social 
transmission.  
Copying others’ behaviours is a useful strategy to learn new behaviours because 
it provides children with possible options. Therefore not as much effort is required to 
find the best solution compared to a trial-and-error method (Rendell et al., 2010). 
Children who were able to copy the behaviour of others were shown to use tools more 
correctly (Nagell et al., 1993), and were also more successful in finding a solution to a 
problem (e.g., retrieving a sticker out of a puzzle box; Wood et al., 2013) than children 
who did not get the chance to observe others’ behaviour.  
A side effect of children’s reliance on social learning is that they tend to over-
imitate others’ behaviour; that is they copy behaviour that is not necessarily functional 
to reach the goal (e.g., Flynn, 2008; McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn & Horner, 2007; Nagell 
et al., 1993; Whiten, Custance, Gomez, Teixidor, & Bard, 1996). Although some 
studies have suggested that children over-imitate because they have poor physical 
understanding about the task and do not realize that the irrelevant actions are actually 
unnecessary (e.g., Lyons, Young & Keil, 2007); other studies have argued against this 
possibility (e.g., Simpson & Riggs, 2011) or suggest a more social explanation (e.g., 
Carpenter, 2006; Hilbrink, Sakkalou, Ellis-Davies, Fowler, & Gattis, 2013; Meltzoff, 
2007). For example, Hilbrink et al. (2013) found that children who were more 
extraverted were also more likely to imitate unnecessary actions. Their explanation for 
this was that children who are more extraverted have a higher desire to interact with 
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other people. A greater interest in the interpersonal aspects of the interaction with the 
experimenter could explain the higher faithful imitation of these children. This suggests 
that social learning might not only serve a functional role in reducing the time required 
to learn new things, but that it might also serve a social function. 
Studies on selective imitation have shown that children do not just copy all 
behaviours. Children selectively copy others more closely when they have a goal to 
affiliate with the model (Over & Carpenter, 2009) or when the model is more socially 
responsive (i.e., a model who performed actions was in the same room vs. shown on a 
television screen; Nielsen, Simcock, & Jenkins, 2008). Furthermore, children are more 
likely to imitate jokes (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011) and unusual novel actions when an 
adult is native-speaking compared to foreign-speaking adults (Buttelmann, Zmyj, 
Daum, & Carpenter, 2012). These studies suggest that children do not just copy any 
behaviour but take into account the characteristics of the model in their assessment as to 
whether to copy the behaviour or not. 
1.1.4 Individual Learning 
Children are generally interested in novelty. They spend more time looking at 
novel stimuli than at familiar stimuli (e.g., Kirkham, Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002), 
which forms the basis of most experimental work on infants’ ability to detect 
differences in stimuli (e.g., Kirkham et al., 2002; Leinbach & Fagot, 1993; Woodward, 
Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2001). As early as 4 months of age, infants understand basic 
properties of objects like solidity (e.g., Baillargeon, Needham, & DeVos, 1992) and 
continuity (e.g., Spelke, Kestenbaum, Simons, & Wein, 1995), and around 12 months 
they distinguish between inanimate and animate objects (e.g., Woodward, 1998). 
Children’s understanding of object properties is likely formed by observing other 
people handle objects (e.g., a ball bounces when it is dropped on the floor from a 
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certain height), or by handling the object themselves (e.g., when I bang this object on 
the table it makes noise). 
1.1.4.1 Object exploration 
Individual learning through the exploration of objects starts in the first year of 
life (e.g., Belsky & Most, 1981; Bourgeois, Khawar, Neal, & Lockman, 2005; 
Lockman, 2000; Lockman & McHale, 1989; Striano & Bushnell, 2005). When children 
are given an object, they, for example, put it in their mouth, move it around, or squeeze 
it. When handling an object, a child explores what the possibilities of an object are and 
what different features it contains. Gibson (1979) called this finding the affordances of 
an object and described this term as follows: “The affordances of the environment are 
what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or for ill” (p. 
127). Affordances are not objective, universal features of an object, but must be seen in 
relation to who is handling the object. Water for example is a liquid that affords 
drinking or washing for a human, but for certain insects this same water affords a 
support to stand on (e.g., water strider; Ward, 1992). In this way, the affordance of 
water to provide support is relative to the insect but not to the human. 
Bourgeois and colleagues (2005) found that 6-month-olds already explore the 
affordances of different objects. Infants were found to take into account both the 
material of the object and the type of surface when performing actions. For example, 
they banged a hard cube on a rigid or discontinuous surface more often than on a 
flexible or liquid surface. Furthermore, infants banged less frequently with the soft cube 
compared to the hard cube, indicating infants’ understanding that hard objects afford to 
make noise while soft objects do so less. By exploring the different affordances of an 
object, children increase their knowledge of the possibilities of that object. This in turn 
gives them more options in how to use the object.  
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Studies on children’s ability to detect affordances in objects (e.g., Bourgeois et 
al., 2005; Lockman, 2000) show us that children do explore objects and differentiate 
their uses. However these studies do not provide us with any information about the 
range of options children can find for different objects nor does it provide us with 
possible individual differences between children’s ability to find multiple options. For 
example, Bourgeois and colleagues provided children with three types of cubes (hard, 
soft and mixed) and different surfaces, but they only reported specific actions that 
allowed them to differentiate between the different blocks and surfaces. Lockman and 
McHale (1989) have previously mentioned how most studies on children’s object 
exploration have focused on children’s ability to detect differences, and not necessarily 
on how they explore the specific objects.  
This thesis aimed to fill this gap by investigating children’s ability to generate 
multiple actions with novel objects. Children were given a box to play with (the 
Unusual Box) that contained different features (e.g., stairs, rings, ledges) in 
combination with novel objects that in shape, texture and size were very different from 
each other. This allowed children to generate a large number of possible actions. 
Individual differences and age-related changes in children’s ability to generate multiple 
actions were assessed.   
1.1.4.2 Generation of iconic gestures as a means of communication 
Children are able to communicate their needs to others as soon as they are born. 
Through crying they tell others that they require food, sleep, comfort, and so on 
(Lummaa, Vuorisalo, Barr, & Lehtonen, 1998). Infants start communicating through 
speech towards the end of the first year (Benedict, 1979), which gives them more 
freedom to express their specific needs. For example, while a cry can stand for different 
needs (Müller, Hollien, & Murry, 1974) words give a more reliable clue of what the 
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child desires  (e.g., saying the word ‘food’ when wanting to be fed). Children learn to 
speak through social learning, by mapping words to specific objects (e.g., Pruden, 
Hirsh-Pasek, Golinkoff, & Hennon, 2006). However, children are also shown to be able 
to generate their own object labels in a joking setting (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011). 
Similarly, deaf children who use sign language instead of verbal language have been 
shown to create their own gestures (Mylander & Goldin-Meadow, 1991). 
Gestures are used as a means of communication from an early age. An 
interesting example is the development of a communication system in deaf children, 
called homesign (Morford & Goldin-Meadow, 1997). Homesign is observed in deaf 
children who are born to hearing parents, but the parents have chosen not to expose 
them to sign language. These children are shown to create stable gesture vocabularies 
including nouns and verbs (Goldin-Meadow, Butcher, Mylander, & Dodge, 1994). 
Similar creations of gestures have been observed in pre-verbal hearing children. For 
example, Acredolo and Goodwyn (2000) described how Acredolo’s daughter Kate 
came up with different ‘baby signs’ to represent objects before she could talk (e.g., 
sniffing gesture for flower).  
 Iconic gestures are a type of gesture that symbolically represent objects, events, 
desires and conditions (Acredolo & Goodwyn, 1988), and are similar irrespective of 
context (Capone & McGregor, 2004). For example, the iconic gesture of a cup (or 
drinking) is holding your hand in a semi-circle and moving it towards your mouth while 
tilting the wrist. Children produce iconic gestures from around 14 months (Acredolo & 
Goodwyn, 1988), which are used in particular to clarify aspects that are harder to 
verbalize (Campana, Silverman, Tanenhaus, & Benetto, 2004). This suggests that 
speech is typically the first choice for communication, while gestures are used in 
addition to speech. 
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 Although children show the ability to produce iconic gestures from early on, it is 
not clear whether children really generate these gestures by themselves. The studies 
which describe children’s production of gestures do not provide a clear picture on how 
children developed the use of these gestures. For example, Kate’s production of the 
baby sign for flower by sniffing could be the action that she associated with seeing a 
flower, perhaps because her mother used to perform this behaviour when receiving 
flowers. Therefore, Kate’s production of the sniffing behaviour does not immediately 
suggest that she produced this gesture in order to communicate, nor whether the 
behaviour is more than an automatic response associated with seeing a flower. 
Another downside of previous studies is that they cannot confirm whether 
children understand that the iconic gesture represents another object. For example, one 
possibility could be that children associate certain movements (e.g., holding your hand 
as a semi-circle and moving it towards your mouth while tilting the wrist) with the 
accompanied response by adults (receiving a cup containing a beverage). This 
association does not require children to understand that adults interpret the child’s 
movement as representing the use of a cup and therefore provide the child with a 
beverage. On the other hand, experimental studies that investigated children’s 
understanding of the representational nature of iconic gestures (e.g., Namy, Campbell, 
& Tomasello, 2004; Tolar, Lederberg, Gokhale, and Tomasello, 2008) only assessed 
children’s responses to iconic gestures produced by an experimenter, and did not look at 
children’s own production of these gestures. Therefore, they cannot provide us with 
information as to whether children use this representational information when they 
generate their own iconic gestures. Our aim was to investigate whether children are 
indeed able to generate iconic gestures they have not seen produced before; whether 
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they generate these gestures in order to communicate with others; and whether they take 
into account the representational nature of iconic gestures. 
1.1.4.3 Generating object substitution actions during pretend play 
Pretend play relates to any play behaviour in which (1) inanimate objects are 
treated as animate (e.g., petting a stuffed toy animal), (2) everyday activities are 
performed in the absence of the necessary materials (e.g., drinking from an empty cup), 
(3) a child preforms actions usually done by someone else (e.g., vacuum cleaning), (4) 
activities are not carried out to their usual outcome (e.g., writing with a pen but not 
leaving a mark on the paper), or (5) one object is substituted for another (e.g., using a 
banana as a phone; McCune-Nicolich, 1981). Before their first birthday, children are 
often introduced to pretend play by their parents. Crawley and Sherrod (1984) found 
that although none of the children performed pretend actions at 7 months, 33% of the 
mothers modelled pretend play actions to their children. This further increased to 75% 
of the mothers showing pretend play to their children at 13 months, by which time 42% 
of children also performed pretend actions. This suggests that children initially observe 
pretend play behaviour before they start using this in their own play.  
Children typically start pretending during their first year of life (McCune-
Nicolich, 1981; Vig, 2007). At first, children perform pretend actions with the actual 
object (e.g., drinking from an empty cup) but during the third year of life children 
become more flexible and show pretending in which they use an object as if it is 
something else (i.e., object substitution). Object substitution requires a child to 
temporarily inhibit the original use of the object, while performing the action of the 
pretend object instead. 
The options of pretending using object substitution are endless. This basically 
means that when using object substitution a child can pretend an object to be whatever 
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s/he wants it to be. However, until 3 years children still rely on the substituted object 
being similar to the pretend object (e.g., pretending a tissue is a blanket; Elder & 
Pederson, 1978). This means that children still rely on physical similarities between the 
object they are holding and the pretend identity they are giving to the object. This 
suggests that children’s ability to mentally represent one object as something 
completely different is still low. 
Current literature cannot shed light on children’s representational abilities when 
using object substitution. Studies which investigated children’s generation of object 
substitution actions often first performed the pretend action themselves (e.g., Harris & 
Kavanaugh, 1993; Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano, 2004) therefore they cannot rule out 
that children simply imitated the pretend action. On the other hand, studies that did not 
model any actions gave specific prompts to indicate what the child should do (e.g., 
“show what Teddy does with a spoon”, Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993). Therefore, children 
might have just performed the action they were told to do, and we do not know for sure 
whether children would indeed be able to create these pretend actions without any help 
from an adult. Our aim was to investigate whether children are indeed able to generate 
object substitution actions without having seen the action modelled beforehand or 
having been given specific prompts to perform a certain action; and whether they take 
into account the representational nature of object substitution actions. 
1.1.4.4 Focus of this thesis 
Although individual learning has been argued to be of similar importance as 
social learning (Mesoudi et al., 2004), most research has focused on social learning and 
seem to diminish the role of individual learning by arguing it is not as efficient (e.g., 
Barr, Dowden, & Hayne, 1996; Ladyshewsky, 2002), that children prefer copying over 
using their own individual experiences (e.g., Jaswal & Markman, 2007), or they discuss 
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it in the light of social learning (i.e., emulation, in which children imitate the goal of an 
action but generate their own way of reaching the same goal; e.g., Horner & Whiten, 
2005). Studies that do investigate individual learning mainly focus on infant’s learning 
experiences when they are very young (e.g., Belsky & Most, 1981; Bourgeois et al., 
2005), or investigate specific skills in adults that contribute to their ability to solve 
problems more effectively (e.g., brainstorming as goal to generate more creative ideas; 
Parnes & Meadow, 1959).  
A more general investigation of children’s ability to use individual learning in 
order to generate new ideas seems to be lacking. To fill this gap, this thesis focused on 
children’s ability to generate novel actions. The rationale for the focus on the generation 
of novel actions was that it allowed us to measure individual learning directly by 
analysing the behaviour of children. Direct behavioural measurements were chosen 
over indirect measures of individual learning through speech, since young children have 
a limited vocabulary and therefore it is hard to reliably asses their cognitive processes 
through speech. Three different types of generating novel actions – generating actions 
with novel objects, generating iconic gestures, and generating pretend actions – were 
chosen to offer a varied investigation of children’s ability to generate novel actions. 
First, we investigated children’s individual learning through the generation of actions 
with of novel objects. The design of this study was open, i.e., no specific instructions 
were given, which allowed children to display their natural curiosity to explore. Novel 
objects were used to observe children’s first encounter with an object and assess how 
they go about exploring the different functions an object could have. Second, we 
investigated children’s ability to use individual learning in a representational way, i.e., 
generate actions that represent another object. In one study we investigated children’s 
ability to use representational (iconic) gestures in a communicative setting, while in 
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another study we used a pretend play setting to investigate children’s ability to 
represent one object for another. For both representation studies familiar objects were 
used. However, in the selection of familiar objects and object combinations we made 
sure to select combinations that decreased the likelihood that children had seen others 
generate these actions before. 
1.1.5 Overarching research aims 
The overall aim of this thesis was to gain information about children’s ability to 
generate actions without getting input from others. This information could give us 
insight into which skills are important for individual learning in children, and it might 
give us ideas for stimulating individual learning. Given that individual learning is 
important to create variation in cultural traits, which in turn is important for us to adapt 
to changes in the environment, the broader impact of this thesis is to gain information 
on what skills children already possess that might help them to become good creators of 
new ideas. 
For all three types of generating novel actions, children’s flexibility is thought to 
be important for their ability to generate actions. When generating multiple actions with 
novel objects, children require a certain curiosity to search beyond the first action 
performed and explore the different uses of the object. Regarding generating iconic 
gestures in order to communicate, verbal requests or pointing to the desired object are 
more common ways of communicating in everyday life (Özçalişkan & Goldin-
Meadow, 2011). However, in our study (see below for a more detailed description) 
these means of communication were not an option. Therefore, children required a 
certain flexibility to switch from their normal means of communication to an alternative 
way, namely using iconic gestures. Finally, when generating object substitution actions 
children needed to be flexible in thinking about the ways an object can be used. During 
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object substitution, the original action with the object has to be inhibited and a different 
action that one normally does with another object has to be performed instead. 
Therefore, children who are flexible in the use of an object are thought to be better at 
object substitution than children who find it hard to inhibit the original action with the 
object. 
1.2 Thesis Outline 
This thesis investigates children’s ability to generate actions in three different 
areas: 1) generating multiple actions with novel objects, 2) generating iconic gestures in 
order to communicate, and 3) generating pretend actions using object substitution.  
Chapter 2 sought to investigate children’s ability to generate multiple actions 
with novel objects. This ability is thought to be influenced by children’s divergent 
thinking skills. Divergent thinking relates to thinking beyond what is available at the 
moment and to search for new alternatives. Children with high divergent thinking skills 
were expected to generate more actions with novel objects than children with low 
divergent thinking skills. In order to investigate this hypothesis, 3- and 4-year-olds were 
tested on three existing measures of divergent thinking in combination with a new test 
that assessed children’s ability to generate multiple actions with novel objects, the 
Unusual Box Test. Divergent thinking was hypothesized to be the main underlying 
factor causing individual differences in novel object exploration, therefore high 
correlations between divergent thinking scores on the existing measures of divergent 
thinking on the one hand, and the number of actions that children generated with the 
novel objects on the other hand were expected. 
A second aim of Chapter 2 was to investigate whether the Unusual Box test was 
applicable to children younger than 3 years. Currently available divergent thinking tests 
allow us to assess children’s divergent thinking skills as young as 3 years. The 
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requirement to respond verbally (e.g., Wallach & Kogan, 1965), and understand the 
task instructions (e.g., TCAM; Torrance, 1981) in currently available divergent thinking 
tests impedes the use of these tests in a younger age group. The Unusual Box test 
sought to evade these requirements by 1) not demanding any verbal responses, and 2) 
limiting task instructions by just prompting children to play with the novel toys. In 
Study 2 of Chapter 2 the test-retest reliability of the Unusual Box Test was assessed in a 
sample of 2-year-olds. High correlations between the number of actions generated in 
the first assessment and a second assessment two weeks later, would indicate that 
children’s divergent thinking scores are stable over a short period of time. Furthermore, 
the absence of a floor effect in children’s scores, which meant that they produced 
multiple actions with the novel objects, and individual differences were indicators that 
the Unusual Box Test was a reliable measure of divergent thinking in children younger 
than 3.  
The experiment in Chapter 3 assessed children’s generation of iconic gestures 
by asking them to request an object with a sticker attached to it. It was impossible to 
request this object through speech, as the experimenter who had the object was wearing 
headphones and therefore could not hear anything the child was saying. The child could 
also not obtain the object by pointing, since there was a second object present that was 
placed immediately next to the target object. Therefore the experimenter could not 
distinguish which of the two objects the child requested when pointing to the object. 
The only other alternative was to make an iconic gesture that represented the object. If 
the iconic gesture was clear enough to distinguish between the two objects, the 
experimenter would understand which object the child requested and in return would 
give the child the object with the sticker. This experimental design allowed us to assess 
1) whether children are able to generate iconic gestures in order to communicate, and 2) 
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whether children understand the representational nature of iconic gestures, and use this 
in their own generation of iconic gestures. All data in Chapter 3 was collected during a 
two-month research visit at Max Planck Institute of Psycholinguistics in the 
Netherlands, in collaboration with Dr Ulf Liszkowski. 
Finally, children’s ability to generate pretend actions using object substitution is 
described in Chapter 4. An important feature of object substitution is that the actions 
performed during pretence are technically wrong actions.  For example, when 
pretending to use a banana as if it is a phone, you are not using the banana for its 
original use; that is pealing the banana and eating it. Instead you are holding the banana 
against your ear and talking into it. The crucial difference between this pretend action 
and making a mistake, when you actually intended to eat the banana, is that during the 
pretend action it was the pretender’s intention to do it ‘wrong’. Study 1 in Chapter 4 
aimed to investigate children’s ability to generate pretend actions using object 
substitution, and whether they distinguished between the intentions of an experimenter 
when she was pretending or making a mistake. 
Furthermore, in Study 2 of Chapter 4 we further investigated two factors that 
were hypothesized to influence children’s ability to generate pretend actions using 
object substitution. First, divergent thinking skills were expected to be positively 
correlated to children’s ability to use object substitution. The hypothesis was that 
children who were flexible in their use of objects (high divergent thinking) would also 
be better in pretending that objects were something else. Second, children’s inhibitory 
control was expected to impact children’s ability to use object substitution. Children 
with low inhibitory control find it difficult to inhibit an initial response and therefore 
were hypothesized to be more likely to do the original action with an object, rather than 
use object substitution to pretend it is something else. We investigated the influence of 
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divergent thinking and inhibitory control on children’s generation of object substitution, 
both in an experimental and free play setting. 
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Abstract 
Divergent thinking shows the ability to search for new ideas, which is an important 
factor contributing to innovation, problem solving, and cultural evolution. Current 
divergent thinking tests allow us to study children’s divergent thinking from 3 years on. 
This paper presents the first measure of divergent thinking that can be used with 
children as young as 2 years. The Unusual Box test is a non-verbal and non-imitative 
test in which children play individually with a novel toy and novel objects. Divergent 
thinking is scored as the number of different actions performed. Study 1 found that the 
Unusual Box test is a valid measure of divergent thinking as it correlates with standard 
measures of divergent thinking in 3- and 4-year-olds. Study 2 indicates that the test can 
be used with 2-year-olds, as it shows high test-retest reliability, demonstrating that 2-
year-olds can think divergently. In both studies individual differences and age-related 
changes were found, indicating that some children are better at divergent thinking than 
others which might make them better innovators in the future, and that children’s 
divergent thinking increases with age. This test will allow us to gain insight into the 
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early emergence of divergent thinking, which is crucial for increasing our 
understanding of cultural evolution and innovation in society. 
Keywords: Divergent thinking; Creativity; Innovation; Cultural Evolution; Toddlers 
2.1 Introduction 
Research on innovation and creativity has received increasing attention over the 
past few years (e.g., Becheikh, Landry, & Amara, 2006; Kaufman, Butt, Kaufman, & 
Colbert-White, 2011; Van der Panne, Van Beers, & KleinKnecht, 2003). Innovation can 
be defined as the process by which new ideas are introduced to a group or society which 
results in increased performance of that group or society (Rogers, 1998). This definition 
highlights two important aspects of innovation: it must be novel, and it must be useful 
or beneficial. In this paper we will focus on the novelty aspect of innovation. To come 
up with novel ideas requires the ability to think beyond what is available at the moment 
and search for new alternatives. This ability to search for new ideas is termed divergent 
thinking (Guilford, 1959). Although there is ample research about divergent thinking in 
adults and older children (for a review see Runco, 1992), we do not yet know how this 
ability emerges. This paper will determine whether we can measure divergent thinking 
in children as young as 2 years. 
One reason that divergent thinking is important is that it is linked to problem 
solving. Guildford (1975) went as far as to state that “all genuine problem solving 
requires at least a minimum of creative thinking” (p. 107). Individuals who can think of 
more different answers to a question are more likely to come up with original, novel 
ideas (e.g., Kim, 2006). Brainstorming is a form of divergent thinking where someone 
produces as many different solutions to a problem as possible without evaluating the 
quality of each solution. Brainstorming is found to increase the number of “good” ideas 
produced during problem solving (Meadow, Parnes, & Reese, 1959; Parnes & Meadow, 
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1959). McAdam and McClelland (2002) emphasize the importance of the generation of 
ideas in the process of innovation. We suggest therefore that divergent thinking is an 
important ability as it could lead to an increase of good ideas and hence help drive 
innovation.  
Divergent thinking may also be an important aspect of cultural evolution. 
According to Mesoudi, Whiten, and Laland (2004) cultural evolution is dependent on 
competition, inheritance, and variation. One requirement of cultural evolution is that 
multiple traits (e.g., artefacts, ideas) are competing for the same purpose. Cultural traits 
can only live on if they are inherited, or socially transmitted, towards other people. A 
widely studied form of social transmission is imitation (e.g., Caldwell & Millen, 2008; 
Horner, Whiten, Flynn, & de Waal, 2006; for an overview of studies with adults: 
Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008; and children: Flynn, 2008). A large body of research shows 
that social transmission through imitation occurs as early as 1 year (e.g., Carpenter, 
Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998; Hanna & Meltzoff, 1993; Ryalls, Gul, & Ryalls, 2000). 
Finally, for cultural evolution to take place variation of cultural traits is required and 
these cultural traits should be different from existing traits. These variations of traits can 
be completely new ideas or behaviours, or modifications of existing traits, and so are in 
essence innovations. Although it is known that infants explore objects as early as 6 
months (Bourgeois, Khawar, Neal, & Lockman, 2005), it is not yet known whether 
young children explore objects divergently. To have a full picture of how we engage in 
cultural evolution, we must determine how variation, or divergent thinking, emerges. 
As divergent thinking is an important factor contributing to innovation, problem 
solving, and cultural evolution, it is important to understand how this ability emerges 
early on. However there are no tools to discover when young children begin to think 
divergently, nor how this process comes about. Several tests of divergent thinking exist 
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which can be reliably used with adults and children of at least 4 or 5 years of age, 
including the Wallach and Kogan tests of creativity (Wallach & Kogan, 1965) and the 
Torrance Test of Creative Thinking (TTCT, Torrance, 1974). These tests involve giving 
as many different responses as possible to questions such as, “How many things are 
round?” However these tests are not suitable for younger children given the verbal task 
demands. The Thinking Creatively in Action and Movement test (TCAM; Torrance, 
1981) was created to resolve this problem. In this test children perform as many actions 
as possible for items such as moving between two lines (e.g., dancing, hopping). 
Although the TCAM is a good alternative to measure divergent thinking in children as 
young as 3 years, there are three important downsides to using it with children younger 
than 3 years. First, these measurements require a level of verbal understanding that 
might not be appropriate for younger children. For example, in three out of four subtests 
the experimenter asks the child, “Now you do something different”. However, the 
understanding of abstract concepts like same and different requires analogical thinking 
which is limited until 3 years (Goswami, 1992). Additionally, most 2-year-olds do not 
yet produce the word “same”, and the word “different” is not in the MacArthur-Bates 
Communicative Development Inventory suggesting it may not be a commonly 
understood word (Dale & Fenson, 1996). Second, all subtests of the TCAM start with 
two examples, which the children imitate to understand the goal of the game. When the 
authors piloted the TCAM on 2-year-olds, children continued imitating rather than 
showing new actions. This is in line with research that children over-imitate at this age 
(e.g., Flynn, 2008). It may also be difficult for toddlers to suppress the modelled actions 
due to inhibitory control demands (e.g., Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994; Simpson & 
Riggs, 2011). Third, the divergent thinking tests that are currently available (TCAM, 
1981; TTCT, 1974; Wallach & Kogan, 1965) mostly investigate novel uses for existing 
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objects (e.g., novel uses of a paper cup; Torrance, 1981). Children under 3 years may 
find it difficult to use familiar objects in novel ways due to inhibitory control demands. 
In order to avoid these task demands a new divergent thinking test is proposed. No 
specific questions are asked of the child, other than to play with some exciting toys for 
a period of time. 
The goal of the current studies was to assess the validity and test-retest 
reliability of a new measure of divergent thinking, called the Unusual Box test. The 
Unusual Box test relies on children's natural curiosity and exploratory behaviour (e.g., 
Bourgeois et al., 2005, Fontenelle, Kahrs, Neal, Newton, & Lockman, 2007), in the 
sense that children are not told in advance to do as many different actions as possible. 
In this test the child is presented with a box with several different features (e.g., round 
hole, strings, stairs). The child is encouraged to play with the box, together with five 
different objects that are unfamiliar to the child. In the first study the Unusual Box test 
was compared to three other divergent thinking tests in 3- and 4-year-olds: the TCAM 
and the Instances and Pattern Meanings subtests of the Wallach-Kogan tests of 
creativity. It was expected that the divergent thinking scores on the Unusual Box test 
would be positively correlated to the scores of the existing divergent thinking tests, 
which would suggest that the Unusual Box test does in fact capture divergent thinking. 
The second study investigated whether the Unusual Box test was a suitable and reliable 
measure for 2-year-olds. High test-retest reliability would suggest that the measure is 
stable over time. Possible age differences in divergent thinking were also investigated 
by combining the data of both studies. 
2.2 Study 1 
Study 1 sought to investigate the validity of the Unusual Box test by comparing 
the scores of 3- and 4-year-olds on the Unusual Box test to their scores on three existing 
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divergent thinking tests: the Instances and Pattern Meanings subtests of the Wallach-
Kogan tests of creativity (Wallach & Kogan, 1965), and the TCAM (Torrance, 1981). 
These tests were chosen because they all have different ways of assessing divergent 
thinking. The Instances subtest asks children verbal questions, and children must give a 
verbal answer. For the Pattern Meaning subtest, the experimenter shows a line drawing, 
and children must respond with a verbal answer. In the TCAM, the experimenter 
demonstrates both verbally and behaviourally (showing examples in movement), and 
the child can respond both verbally and behaviourally. 
2.2.1 Method 
2.2.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-four children participated (13 males, mean age = 45 months, 27 days; 
range = 37 months, 1 day – 57 months, 20 days; SD = 5 months, 21 days). An 
additional eight children were excluded due to failure to engage (6) or to complete one 
or more tasks (2). Children were recruited from nurseries and playgroups. All children 
were British.  
2.2.1.2 Design 
A within-subjects design was used. All children were tested on the Unusual Box 
test, Instances, Pattern Meanings, and the TCAM across three separate occasions 
(average number of days between assessment 1 and 3: 35 days, range 0-89 days, SD = 
25 days). The order in which the tests were run was counterbalanced between children, 
although Instances and Pattern Meanings were always run together. For the Unusual 
Box test, the order of objects given to children was counterbalanced. 
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2.2.1.3 Measures 
Unusual Box test 
The apparatus consisted of a wooden box (34x18x14cm) with an open top. It 
contained the following features (see Figure 1): (1) Ledges; three small blocks attached 
to an external wall of the box, and one shelf-like block upon which objects could be 
placed. (2) Strings; 21 aligned tie-wrap straps of various colours. A wire was guided 
through the opening of the tie-wrap straps so they could hang down on an external wall 
of the box. The wire had two knots on each side and was attached to the side of the box. 
The strings could be moved up and down, as well as be bent. (3) Rings; seven closed 
tie-wraps in different sizes and colours, attached to an external wall of the box. (4) 
Round hole; a hole (5.7cm in diameter) cut into the short side of the box opposite the 
strings. (5) Rectangular room; a space of 10x5x8cm that could be reached via the round 
hole or the top of the box. (6) Stairs; two steps and a small edge on the top, covering 
two-thirds of the inside of the box. The stairs could be reached from the top of the box. 
The box was placed on a black plastic turntable (25cm in diameter), to make sure that 
each side of the box could be easily reached by the child. Furthermore, five objects 
were used in the Unusual Box test, which were novel to the participants (see Figure 1): 
a spiral-shaped egg holder, spatula, feather roller, Kong rubber toy and hook. A digital 
video camcorder (SONY Handycam) was placed on a tripod on the left-hand side 
behind the child (approximately 1 meter away). The camera was angled down from 
approximately 1 meter high, in order to film the actions that the child performed in front 
of, as well as inside, the box. 
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 Figure 1: The Unusual Box (containing the following features: ledges, strings, 
rings, round hole, rectangular room, and stairs); and the novel objects used in the 
Unusual Box test (from left to right: egg holder, spatula, feather roller, Kong 
rubber toy, and hook). 
 
At the start of the Unusual Box test the experimenter explained to the child that 
they would play a fun game. She put the turntable on the table, and placed the Unusual 
Box on top of it. The experimenter highlighted each part of the box in the following 
order: ledges (named ‘blocks’), strings, rings, round hole, rectangular room (named 
‘little room’), and stairs. The experimenter turned the box while explaining so that the 
specific features were directly in front of the child. The child was given a chance to turn 
the box as well. Next, the child was told that he or she could play with the box together 
with another toy, until the experimenter instructed that he or she should stop. The child 
was then given one out of five objects. He or she was given 90 seconds to play with 
each object, after which the object was replaced by a new one. When the child asked for 
clarification of the use of the object, the experimenter responded by saying, “I don’t 
know, you have a look and see what you can do.” At the end of the test, the child was 
given a sticker as a reward for participation. 
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The behaviour of the child was coded for all five trials. Each trial started the 
moment that the child took the novel object from the experimenter, and lasted for 90 
seconds. Actions were recorded on two features: what action was performed (e.g., 
jump, hit, place; for full list see Appendix A, p. 167) and what part of the box was used 
during the action (e.g., ledges, round hole, see Appendix A, p. 167). One action might 
be rolling one of the objects on the stairs. Actions performed on the box with the hands 
instead of an object were counted as an action. Actions that were performed without 
using the box, with the object only, were also counted. Performance of the same action 
with different objects was counted as one action. Inter-rater agreement was calculated 
on the individual actions children performed.  For each possible action (180 actions in 
total) it was assessed whether either or both raters had coded the action as being 
generated or not. Inter-rater agreement for 20% of the videos was good (Cohen’s kappa 
= 0.81). 
For each child two different types of scores were calculated: a fluency score and 
an originality score. The fluency score consisted of the number of different actions that 
the child performed for all trials combined (5 x 90 seconds). In addition to analyzing 
children’s number of responses (fluency), the quality of their responses was analyzed 
by calculating originality scores. Each separate action that a child performed was given 
an originality score based on an originality index. Actions that were performed by fewer 
than 5% of the children got a score of 3; actions performed by fewer than 20% of the 
children got a score of 2; actions performed by 20-50% of the children got a score of 1; 
and actions performed by more than 50% of the children got a score of 0 (note that in 
order to get a sufficient distribution of originality scores it was necessary to combine 
the actions performed in Studies 1 and 2; N = 40). Next, a total originality score was 
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calculated for each child by adding up the originality scores of all the actions that he or 
she had performed.  
Instances 
Three out of four items of the original Instances subtest (Wallach & Kogan, 
1965) were used. The items were presented in the following order: “Name all round 
things you can think of”, “Name all the things you can think of that will make noise”, 
and “Name all the things you can think of that move on wheels”. The item “Name all 
the square things you can think of” was removed from the test because during pilot 
testing 3-year-olds had trouble understanding what square meant, and responded with 
random answers.  
The child was asked to name as many things that could encompass a statement 
as they could think of. There was no time limit for children to respond. If the child gave 
no more responses and the experimenter had asked twice whether he or she could give 
another answer to the question, the experimenter continued with a new question. A 
voice recorder (Olympus) was used to record the children’s answers. 
The responses of the child were coded for fluency and originality. Fluency 
scores were calculated by counting the number of different correct answers that a child 
gave. For example, when asked to “name all the round things you can think of” a circle 
was coded as a correct answer, while a knife was coded as incorrect. A total score was 
calculated by adding up the number of correct answers on all items. Originality scores 
were computed by adding up the total number of unique correct answers given, 
compared to the other children in the sample, following Wallach and Kogan (1965). 
Pattern Meanings 
The Pattern Meanings subtest included a series of line drawings. Only the first 
four out of nine items mentioned by Wallach and Kogan (1965) were used (See 
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Appendix B, p.169). The other items were excluded because during pilot testing 3-year-
olds did not pay attention for more than four items and did not want to continue, or kept 
on answering “I don’t know”. A voice recorder (Olympus) was used to record the 
child’s answers. 
The child was presented with one of the four drawing each time and he or she 
had to describe what different things the drawings could be. There was no time limit for 
children to respond. If the child gave no more responses and the experimenter had 
asked twice whether he or she could think of something else that it could be the child 
was presented with a new picture. The responses of the child were coded for fluency 
and originality, in the same way as in the Instances subtest. 
TCAM 
All four subtests of the TCAM (Torrance, 1981) were run. First, the subtest, 
“What might it be?” was run, in which the child had to think of as many uses for a 
paper cup as possible. Five white polystyrene cups were used. Two examples, using the 
cup as a hat and driving it around like a car, were given before the child could have a 
turn. In the second subtest, “How many ways?” two lines were created on the floor 
(approximately 1.5 meters apart) using duct-tape. The child was asked to move between 
two lines in as many ways as possible. Walking and crawling were given as examples. 
In the third subtest called, “Can you move like?” the child responded to six statements, 
e.g., “Can you move like a tree in the wind?” (for all statements, see Torrance, 1981). 
As this subtest was a task of pretending, and was only scored for imagination and not 
necessarily divergent thinking, this subtest was not analysed. For the last subtest, “What 
other ways?” the same polystyrene cups from the first subtest were used and a small 
garbage bin. The child was asked to put cups into a bin in as many different ways as 
possible. Two examples given were putting the cup on the palm of the hand and 
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pushing it in with the other hand and throwing the cup in the bin while standing a meter 
away from the bin. The child’s actions were recorded with two digital video camcorders 
(SONY Handycam) on tripods. The cameras were placed in two corners of the room, 
such that all the child’s movements were visible by at least one of the cameras. There 
was no time limit on children’s responses in any subtest.  
The behaviour of the child was coded for fluency and originality. Fluency scores 
were calculated by counting the number of different correct answers. For the “What 
might it be?” subtest, correct answers included actions that involved placing the cup in 
unusual places or building something out of several cups. The “How many ways?” 
subtest was coded for the number of times a child moved in a different way.  For the 
“What other ways” subtest, correct answers included dropping the cup into the bin from 
one of the child’s body parts (e.g., knee drop, arm drop, head drop), making specific 
movements with the cup (e.g., spin) before throwing it into the bin or putting the cup 
into the bin accompanied by something else (e.g., skip to the bin, then throw the cup in 
the bin). Lists of some possible answers for all three subtests are given by Torrance 
(1981).  
Originality scores were calculated following the manual provided with the 
TCAM (Torrance, 1981). Each response in the manual corresponds with an originality 
score. This score was based “primarily upon the statistical infrequency of the response 
in a normative sample of five hundred children” (Torrance, 1981, p. 15). Each separate 
response was given an originality score between 0 and 4. All scores were added up to 
provide a total originality score.  
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2.2.2 Results 
2.2.2.1 Validity of fluency scores 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the fluency scores for each test. 
Children performed on average 24.0 actions on the Unusual Box test, with a range of 8 
to 34 actions. No effects of gender were found in any analyses. Age was positively 
correlated to the Instances (Pearson’s r = .47, p = .022) and Pattern Meanings subtests 
(Pearson’s r = .40, p = .05). Therefore further analyses were corrected for age.  
The correlations between the test scores are also given in Table 1. The Unusual 
Box test was positively correlated to the Instances subtest and the TCAM, but not to the 
Pattern Meanings subtest. In fact, the Pattern Meanings subtest scores were not 
significantly correlated to any of the other tests, including the Instances subtest. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Fluency Scores among all Divergent 
Thinking Tests in Study 1. 
   Correlations 
 Mean    Range Age 1
a 
2
a 
3
a 
1. Unusual Box test 24.00 (6.5)    8 – 34 .18    
2. Instances 8.33 (4.1)    2 – 18 .49*  .49*   
3. Pattern Meanings
 
5.83 (2.0)    3 – 10 .44* .34 .22  
4. TCAM 91.58 (11.2)    71 – 114 -.32   .60**   .60** .02 
Note: N = 24. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
a 
Partial correlations, corrected for age. 
*p < .05. **p < .01 
 
2.2.2.2 Validity of originality scores 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the originality scores for each test. No 
differences in gender or age were found. The originality scores of the Unusual Box test 
and the Pattern Meanings subtests were positively correlated. The positive correlations 
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between the originality scores of the Unusual Box test and both the Instances subtest 
and TCAM were marginally significant (p = .06 and p = .07 respectively). However, for 
every test the originality and fluency scores were correlated (Unusual Box: Pearson’s r 
= .877, p < .001; Instances: Pearson’s r = .839, p < .001; Pattern Meanings: Pearson’s r 
= .578, p = .003; TCAM: Pearson’s r = .688, p < .001). Therefore ratio scores were 
calculated for all measures by dividing originality scores by fluency scores. None of the 
ratio originality scores correlated with each other (all p > .180). This indicates that any 
correlations that existed between the originality scores were due to correlations between 
the fluency scores. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Originality Scores among all 
Divergent Thinking Tests in Study 1. 
   Correlations 
 Mean Range 1
 
2 3 4 
1. Unusual Box 21.17 (9.0) 4 – 41     
2. Instances 2.96 (2.3) 0 – 8 .42*    
3. Pattern Meaning 2.04 (1.3) 0 – 5 .39† .16   
4. TCAM 95.83 (9.6) 80 – 112 .38† .22 .22  
Note: N = 24. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
*p < .05, †p<.1 
 
 
2.2.3 Discussion 
The results show positive correlations between the fluency scores of the 
Unusual Box test, the Instances subtest, and the TCAM, with moderate to large effect 
sizes. This suggests that similar constructs are measured by these three tests. No 
significant correlation was found between the fluency scores of the Unusual Box test 
and Pattern Meanings. Interestingly however, many children could not think of more 
than one answer for each item on the Pattern Meanings subtest. This suggests a floor 
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effect, and that the Pattern Meanings subtest might be too difficult for children as young 
as 3 years. Most studies using Pattern Meanings as a measure of divergent thinking 
tested participants of 5 years or older (e.g., Chan et al., 2001; Claridge & MacDonald, 
2009; Runco, 1986). The results of this study suggest that 5 years might be an 
appropriate cut-off point for using the Pattern Meanings subtest. Given that the fluency 
scores on the Unusual Box test, Instances subtest and TCAM are all correlated with 
each other, the Unusual Box test appears to be a valid measure of divergent thinking. 
Although the originality scores of the different tests were moderately correlated, 
this was due to the high correlations between originality and fluency scores on all tests. 
Previous studies have also reported similar correlations between fluency and originality 
scores (e.g., Clark & Mirels, 1970; Torrance, 2008). A possible explanation can be 
found in Mednick’s associative theory (Mednick, 1962), which states that original ideas 
are in principle remote. This means that people typically get original ideas after the 
more obvious ideas are depleted. It endorses the idea that high divergent thinking may 
lead to more novel and original ideas (e.g., Kim 2006), and confirms the importance of 
divergent thinking to enable cultural evolution, as it would produce more novel ideas. 
2.3 Study 2 
Study 2 sought to investigate the test-retest reliability of the Unusual Box test in 
2-year-olds. If it is possible to use the Unusual Box test with children younger than 3 
years, we might be able to investigate the emergence and development of divergent 
thinking. Furthermore, data from Studies 1 and 2 were combined to explore age 
differences in divergent thinking. 
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2.3.1 Method 
2.3.1.1 Participants 
Sixteen two-year-olds participated (7 males, mean age = 28 months, 5 days; 
range = 24 months, 12 days – 32 months, 29 days; SD = 2 months, 22 days). Two 
additional children were excluded from the study because they did not attend the second 
assessment (1) or failed to engage with the task (1). All children were British and of 
white ethnicity, and most parents had an education level of undergraduate degree or 
higher (6 Postgraduate degree, 6 Undergraduate, 2 High School, 2 unknown). Children 
were recruited from posters and parent-toddler groups as well as via online 
advertisements. 
2.3.1.2 Materials 
The materials used for the Unusual Box test were identical to those used in 
Study 1. 
2.3.1.3 Design 
A within-subjects design was used. All children completed the Unusual Box test 
twice, two weeks apart. Counterbalancing of objects was the same as in Study 1. For the 
second assessment, a different order of the objects was used. 
2.3.1.4 Procedure 
A short warm-up consisted of the child playing with a toy tractor and a stuffed 
toy gorilla. The procedure of the Unusual Box test was the same as in Study 1.  
2.3.1.5 Coding 
Coding for the Unusual Box test was the same as in Study 1.  
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2.3.2 Results 
2.3.2.1 Test-retest reliability of fluency scores 
The average score on the first assessment of the Unusual Box test was 19.3 
actions (SD = 5.9, range = 10-32) and 20.5 on the second assessment (SD = 5.9, range 
= 12-36).    No effects of gender were found in any analyses. No differences in scores 
were found between assessment 1 and assessment 2 (paired-sample t = 1.106, p = 
0.286), indicating that children obtained similar scores on both assessments. A strong 
positive correlation was found between the scores of the two assessments (Pearson’s r = 
0.738, p = .001), indicating high test-retest reliability. The children performed on 
average 11.5 actions (SD = 4.0, range = 4-21) during the second assessment that were 
identical to the actions performed during the first assessment. In order to compare only 
the number of novel actions produced during both assessments the number of identical 
actions was subtracted from the total fluency scores of assessment 2. Compared to the 
first assessment children extended their use of the objects on the second assessment 
with on average 9.0 novel actions (SD = 3.2, range = 4-15). The fluency scores on 
assessment 1 were not significantly correlated to the number of novel actions performed 
on assessment 2 (Pearson’s r = .218, p = .418). This suggests that although children 
performed novel actions during both assessments, children with high fluency scores on 
assessment 1 were not more likely to produce more novel actions in assessment 2. 
However, children with high fluency scores in assessment 2 were more likely to 
produce novel actions during that same assessment (Pearson’s r = .782, p < .001). 
Furthermore, older 2-year-olds were more likely to produce novel actions on the second 
assessment than younger 2-year-olds (Pearson’s r = .592, p = .016). 
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2.3.2.2 Test-retest reliability of originality scores 
Congruent with Study 1, a strong positive correlation was found between 
originality scores and fluency scores on both assessments (assessment 1: r = .889, p < 
.001; assessment 2: r = .954, p < .001). Therefore for further analyses ratio originality 
scores were used. 
On the first assessment children’s average ratio originality score was 0.76 
(range = 0.39-1.13, SD = 0.20) and 0.75 (range = 0.33-1.22, SD = 0.26) on the second 
assessment. No differences were found between the ratio originality scores on 
assessment 1 and assessment 2 (paired-sample t = .037, p = .971) and a positive 
correlation was found between the ratio originality scores of the two assessments 
(Pearson’s r = .577, p = .019). This indicates that ratio originality scores are reliable 
over time. When only taking into account the novel actions in assessment 2 which the 
child did not produce in assessment 1, a positive correlation between the originality 
scores of assessment 1 and the originality scores of the novel actions in assessment 2 
remained (Pearson’s r = 0.572, p = 0.021). This indicates that children who produced 
original novel actions in the first assessment also produced more original novel actions 
in the second assessment.   
2.3.2.3 Age differences in generating novel actions 
The data of both studies were combined to investigate whether fluency and ratio 
originality scores on the Unusual Box test increased with age. For the 2-year-olds, only 
the actions from the first assessment were considered. Age was positively correlated 
with both fluency (Pearson’s r = .379, p = .016) and ratio originality scores (Pearson’s 
r = .314, p = .049). 
Chapter 2: Generating multiple actions with novel objects 
______________________________________________________________________   
61 
 
2.3.3 Discussion 
The results of Study 2 show a strong correlation between the two assessments of 
the Unusual Box test, indicating high test-retest reliability, both for fluency and ratio 
originality scores. Children’s divergent thinking skills are stable enough to yield similar 
findings two weeks later. When during the second assessment only novel actions (i.e., 
actions which the child did not produce during the first assessment) were taken into 
account, a positive relationship between the originality scores remained. Children who 
performed more original novel actions on the first assessment also produced more 
original novel actions two weeks later. However, there was no significant relationship 
between the number of novel actions on the two assessments. A possible reason for the 
non-significant correlation is the fact that the same objects were used on both occasions. 
Therefore, any actions that children produced in assessment 2 which they also produced 
in assessment 1 could not be counted as novel actions. The children in this sample 
produced between 4 and 21 actions which were identical on both occasions. The 
downside of calculating novel action production on assessment 2 by discounting all 
identical actions is that children with high fluency scores on assessment 1 have a higher 
chance of producing identical actions. Consequently, children who produced many 
novel actions in the first assessment had a lower chance of producing novel actions in 
the second assessment, while children who produced few novel actions in the first 
assessment had a higher chance. This decreased the chances of finding a significant 
relationship between the number of novel actions in both assessments. 
The use of the same objects on both assessments was useful to assess the test-
retest reliability of this specific measure. When divergent thinking in young children is 
assessed on only one occasion the Unusual Box test is a valid and reliable measure. 
However, for future studies that are specifically interested in the production of novel 
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actions over several time points, it is advised that different objects and a box with 
different features are used. 
When combining the results from both studies, age differences were found for 
both fluency and ratio originality scores, with older children performing on average 
more different and more original actions than younger children. This is in line with 
earlier findings that divergent thinking skills increase with age (a trend that continues 
until middle age: McCrae, Arenberg, & Costa, 1987). By inspecting the range of scores, 
it appears that while the lower end of the range stays stable across age, the upper end of 
the range increases with age. One possibility is that children of all ages perform basic 
actions, but with increasing age more sophisticated actions are added to their repertoire.  
2.4 General Discussion 
Our findings suggest that the Unusual Box test shows good psychometric 
properties. Examination of the test’s concurrent validity indicates that fluency scores 
correlate well with other divergent thinking measures that are suitable for 3-year-olds – 
the TCAM (1981) and the Instances subtest of the Wallach-Kogan tests of creativity 
(1965). Furthermore, the Unusual Box test is characterized by high test-retest reliability 
over time in 2-year-olds both for fluency and ratio originality scores. The range in 
scores that we found on the Unusual Box test indicates that individual differences exist 
in children’s divergent thinking. The brevity and simplicity of this measure contributes 
to the easy application of this test with children as young as 2 years of age. 
As far as we know, the Unusual Box test is unique in that it uses novel objects to 
measure divergent thinking. In Study 2 we administered the Unusual Box test twice on 
the same children. The results showed that divergent thinking scores did not 
significantly change on the second assessment. Although children did perform actions 
on the second assessment which they performed on the first assessment as well, each 
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child performed multiple novel actions that were not seen on their first assessment. This 
shows that although children have more experience with the novel objects, on multiple 
encounters they still produce novel actions. Therefore administering the Unusual Box 
test multiple times does not seem to have an effect on children’s divergent thinking 
scores.  
2.4.1 Individual Learning and Social Learning 
Our results suggest that adopting a divergent thinking strategy could increase 
the impact of individual learning on cultural evolution. Children who explored more 
(fluency) also tended to find more different uses for an object, leading to higher 
originality scores. This finding highlights the important role that exploration plays in 
increasing variation in a culture, as emphasized by Mesoudi and Whiten (2004). The 
current study displayed individual differences in children’s divergent thinking scores, 
indicating that some children are more likely to find novel uses for objects than others. 
In a 22-year longitudinal study, older children’s divergent thinking scores on the 
Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking showed moderate to high correlations with their 
future creative achievements and careers (Plucker, 1999; Torrance, 1987). From a 
broader perspective, toddlers and preschoolers with high divergent thinking scores may 
in the future make a bigger contribution to cultural evolution than children with lower 
divergent thinking scores.  
Further questions remain as to how individual learning and social learning 
interact. A study examining exploration by Bonawitz and colleagues (2011) suggests 
that in some situations social learning might actually have a limiting effect on divergent 
thinking. When an experimenter modelled an action on a novel object and gave 
pedagogical cues, toddlers copied the action more, and explored less, than when the 
experimenter did not model the action. This suggests social learning may limit 
Chapter 2: Generating multiple actions with novel objects 
______________________________________________________________________   
64 
 
divergent thinking. However Hoicka and Akhtar (2011) found that copying an 
experimenter’s jokes allowed children to then create their own novel jokes. This 
suggests social learning may instead increase divergent thinking. Future studies should 
focus explicitly on the interaction between social and individual learning, to investigate 
how these types of learning complement or hinder one another.  
The objects for the Unusual Box test are novel to the child and no modelling is 
provided by the experimenter. Therefore any actions performed by the child are self-
initiated, making it possible to distinguish individual learning from imitation. This is an 
important advantage compared to the TCAM, which relies on examples and imitation in 
its explanation of the tasks. The Unusual Box test could thus complement on-going 
research on imitation and provide knowledge on how individual learning and social 
transmission interact to initiate cultural evolution, as there are no confounds with 
imitation in the Unusual Box test.  
2.4.2 Age 
Children’s divergent thinking fluency and ratio originality scores increased with 
age. One possible explanation for this increase is that children’s motor skills are not yet 
fully developed by the age of 2 years (Ireton & Vader, 2004). Therefore, an 
improvement in children’s divergent thinking scores could be caused by an 
improvement in motor skills. In future studies, it would be beneficial to examine 
whether there is a relation between motor skills and divergent thinking through the 
Unusual Box test in younger toddlers.  
However, previous research has shown that divergent thinking skills improve up 
until middle age (McCrae et al., 1987). Motor skills are unlikely to be the only factor 
behind an increase in divergent thinking scores up until middle age so other factors 
must influence divergent thinking as well. Kaufman and Kaufman (2004) proposed a 3-
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stage framework of animal creativity, which we propose can be applied to young 
children as well. The first stage involves recognizing novelty, the second stage involves 
observational learning, and the third stage involves innovative behaviour. At a young 
age, children may derive more benefit from observational learning than from individual 
learning, because the amount of observed behaviour that is novel to the child is more 
abundant. When children then produce the observed behaviour themselves, we call it 
imitative rather than creative behaviour. However, for the child, performing this 
behaviour is novel and creative from their point of view, and may be just as valuable as 
individual learning. When a child gets older, a greater proportion of observed behaviour 
will be familiar and therefore individual learning might become more valuable to the 
child compared to observational learning, with children’s divergent thinking skills 
improving as a consequence. Again, this reinforces the importance of examining the 
interaction between divergent thinking and social learning. 
2.4.3 Intrinsic Motivation 
The Unusual Box test is unique in comparison to other divergent thinking 
measures in that children are not prompted to think divergently. Therefore, divergent 
thinking scores obtained with the Unusual Box test reflect the child’s own intrinsic 
motivation to think divergently and not necessarily the child’s most creative output. 
However, the results show that the fluency scores of the Unusual Box test are positively 
correlated to the fluency scores of the Instances subtest and TCAM where children are 
prompted to give as many responses as possible. This suggests that whether or not 
children are prompted, they reveal similar individual differences in divergent thinking. 
One possibility is that children in general act on their highest level of divergent 
thinking, and prompting them to do so does not make them think more divergently. 
Runco, Illies, and Eisenman (2005) demonstrated that even slight changes in task 
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instructions can influence participants’ divergent thinking scores; however a control 
condition with no specific task instructions to be creative was omitted. Thus another 
possibility is that all children would get higher scores when prompted compared to 
when they are unprompted, but that children still display the same overall spread in 
divergent thinking scores. A final possibility is that prompting might influence some 
children but not others. Thus extrinsic motivation may act as a separate factor which 
could interact with children’s intrinsic motivation to think divergently. Future research 
should investigate how prompting affects children’s divergent thinking scores, and the 
extent to which children actually understand the task instructions. 
2.4.4 Future Research 
Future research should examine the intrinsic and extrinsic factors that might 
underlie individual differences in divergent thinking. These are likely to include novelty 
seeking (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004), executive function (e.g., Carson, Peterson, & 
Higgins, 2003; De Dreu, Nijstad, Baas, Wolsink, & Roskes, 2012), and parenting styles 
(e.g., Bayard-de-Volo & Fiebert, 1977; Dreyer & Wells, 1966; Miller & Gerard, 1979). 
The Unusual Box test is also relevant for use in Artificial Intelligence and robotics in 
three ways. First, it can directly provide a tool to examine divergent thinking in robots, 
following recent embodied approaches to creativity in AI (e.g., Saunders, 
Gemeinboeck, Lombard Bourke, & Kocabali, 2010). Second, it highlights that 
divergent thinking can be for a large part intrinsically motivated, which converges with 
AI research which focusses on autonomy in creativity (e.g., al-Rifaie, Bishop, & 
Caines, 2012; Jordanous, 2012; Saunders, 2012). Third, by further examining physical, 
social, cognitive, emotional, and other factors that affect divergent thinking in early 
development, we can better understand how divergent thinking emerges, allowing for 
more sophisticated computational models of divergent thinking to be developed. 
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Finally, future research should investigate whether the Unusual Box test is 
suitable to use with children younger than 2 years of age. Children under 2 years have 
even less experience with objects. Thus research with younger toddlers might give us an 
even better insight into how children use individual learning to acquire knowledge 
about novel objects, with as little experience as possible from social learning. 
Furthermore, the non-verbal and non-imitative nature of the test makes it possible to use 
this test on special populations with communicative delays or disabilities such as deaf 
children of non-signing parents, or children with autism. Therefore this test might 
provide a more accurate index of divergent thinking in these populations, as 
communicative demands are more limited for the Unusual Box test than for the TCAM 
or Wallach and Kogan’s tests of creativity.  
2.4.5 Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates that the Unusual Box test is a valid measure of 
divergent thinking which can be reliably used with 2-year-olds. The test is 
recommended for young children over existing divergent thinking tests because of its 
non-verbal and non-imitative nature. This test allows us to gain insight into early 
emergence of divergent thinking, which is crucial for increasing our understanding of 
cultural evolution and innovation in society. 
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Abstract 
In this paper we presented the first experimental study to investigate children’s ability 
to generate their own iconic gestures (i.e., non-verbal gestures that symbolically 
represent a referent object) in order to communicate. Twenty 3.5- to 4-year-olds were 
presented with two objects, a target object which had a sticker attached to it and a 
distractor object. Children were asked to retrieve the object with the sticker. Crucially, 
the only way to retrieve the target object was through generating iconic gestures since it 
was impossible for children to communicate with the experimenter through other 
communicative means (i.e., talking or pointing).  Children generated correct iconic 
gestures on 71% of the trials, and almost all iconic gestures produced represented the 
target object (97.3%). The results could not be explained through deferred imitation or 
automatic motor responses. These results corroborate previous literature which shows 
that children understand the communicative and representational nature of iconic 
gestures. Importantly, this research extends the previous literature by demonstrating that 
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children can make use of their understanding of the communicative and representational 
nature of iconic gestures in the same way as adults do; namely to use them as a means 
to communicate with others. 
Keywords: Iconic gestures, Communication, Representation, Preschoolers 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Gestures are an important part of communicative development (e.g., Acredolo & 
Goodwyn, 1988; Bernardis & Gentilucci, 2006; Goodwyn & Acredolo, 1993). Both 
language and gestures can symbolize objects and actions that are represented in the real 
world. The use of gestures is common in daily communication, and they are used in 
particular to clarify aspects that are harder to verbalize (Campana, Silverman, 
Tanenhaus, & Benetto, 2004). Gestures are said to aid speech, while speech inhibits the 
use of gestures (Bernardis & Gentilucci, 2006). This reinforces the idea that the 
communicative nature of gestures is different when used on their own compared to 
when used in combination with speech (Goldin-Meadow, 1999). This study focuses on 
children’s production of iconic gestures without speech. It investigates whether children 
are able to generate their own iconic gestures, and whether they understand the 
communicative and representational nature of their gestures. 
Iconic gestures are non-verbal gestures that symbolically represent objects, 
events, desires and conditions (Acredolo & Goodwyn, 1988). They are often referred to 
as representational, referential, or symbolic gestures (e.g., Bates & Dick, 2002; Capirci, 
Contaldo, Caselli, & Volterra, 2005). Iconic gestures are different from deictic gestures 
(e.g., pointing) because an iconic gesture carries meaning as it symbolizes the referent, 
and the gesture is similar irrespective of context (Capone & McGregor, 2004). 
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Children produce iconic gestures from around 14 months (Acredolo & 
Goodwyn, 1988). At this age children’s iconic gestures depict the function rather than 
the shape of objects, and tend to develop alongside word production (Acredolo & 
Goodwyn, 1988). Although children produce iconic gestures from this young age, they 
still do not seem to fully grasp the relation between an iconic gesture and its intended 
referent (Namy, 2001; Namy, Campbell, & Tomasello, 2004). This changes around 26 
months, when children are more likely to associate iconic gestures with specific objects 
(Namy & Waxman, 1998; Namy et al., 2004) and also start using them more frequently 
(Özçalişkan & Goldin-Meadow, 2011). 
Twenty-six-month-olds understand the communicative nature of iconic gestures. 
Namy (2008) taught children iconic gestures associated with familiar and novel objects. 
When the experimenter later asked for an object while performing the gesture, children 
were more likely to give the object associated with the iconic gesture than a distractor 
object. However, Namy et al. (2004) found that the gesture does not necessarily have to 
be iconic for children to understand the association between the gesture and object, as 
14-month-olds and 4-year-olds responded similarly to arbitrary gestures and iconic 
gestures. This suggests that there is no advantage for iconic over arbitrary gestures early 
in development. 
Children’s understanding of the representational nature of iconic gestures 
develops from around 3 years. Twenty-six-month-olds show a preference for learning 
iconic over arbitrary gestures, suggesting that the representational aspect of a gesture 
aids children’s understanding of that gesture (Namy et al., 2004). However, Tomasello, 
Striano, and Rochat (1999) found that 26-month-olds were only able to select the 
correct referent for iconic gestures when the gesture had been previously modelled in 
the context of using an object (e.g., hammering with a hammer on the floor during the 
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model phase, and then hammering with a fist on the floor during the gesture phase). 
When the model action and iconic gesture were not identical (e.g., in the model phase 
rolling paper like a ball over the floor, and then in the gesture phase gesturing a 
throwing action) 26-month-olds had trouble selecting the correct referent. A possible 
explanation they give is that seeing the gesture in the context of the conventional use of 
the referent object activates the corresponding motor scheme that makes them retrieve 
the correct object. Only at 35 months did children recognize iconic gestures that were 
not modelled before. This may suggest that 26-month-olds rely on motor scheme 
activation, while 35-month-olds may understand the representational nature of iconic 
gestures.  
Additionally, in an experiment by Tolar, Lederberg, Gokhale, and Tomasello 
(2008), children were shown an iconic gesture (in American Sign Language) and they 
had to choose which item out of four pictures was represented by the gesture. Two and 
a half-year-olds had trouble doing this, with only 2 out of 14 children performing above 
chance. From the age of 3 years children seemed to understand the iconicity of gestures. 
Children performed better with increasing age up until 4.5 years when all children 
performed above chance. Children found iconic gestures that represented the action of 
the referent (e.g., eating for spoon) easier to understand than iconic gestures that depict 
the static features of the referent (e.g., gesturing the contours of a house). 
The literature to date focuses on whether children understand that other people’s 
iconic gestures represent objects, and serve to communicate (e.g., Namy & Waxman, 
1998, 2000; Namy et al., 2004; Namy, 2008; Tolar et al., 2008). However, little 
research focuses on children’s generation of gestures. Some studies look at children’s 
spontaneous production of gestures in a naturalistic setting (e.g., Acredolo & Goodwyn, 
1988; Goodwyn & Acredolo, 1993; Özçalişkan & Goldin-Meadow, 2011), or they 
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focus on children’s natural gesturing (not necessarily iconic gestures) in combination 
with speech (e.g., Goldin-Meadow, Wein & Chang, 1992; Morford & Goldin-Meadow, 
1992). These studies give us great insight into the occurrence of gesture production 
from a young age. However, these studies do not shed light on the question as to 
whether children generate these gestures themselves (versus copying gestures), and 
whether they use them in the same way as adults do, namely to communicate to others.  
Experimental research could help us determine whether children can themselves 
generate iconic gestures in order to communicate to others. Indeed, experimental 
studies show that children use deictic gestures (i.e., pointing) to communicate to others. 
Twelve-month-olds are shown to help others find objects by pointing at the correct 
location (Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, & Tomasello, 2006; Liszkowski, Carpenter, 
& Tomasello, 2008). Furthermore, Knudsen and Liszkowski (2012a) found that 18-
month-old children inform an ignorant experimenter when the location of a target object 
was changed by pointing to the new location. Also, when a desirable toy was replaced 
by an aversive object, children pointed to the location where the desirable toy was 
before, supposedly to warn the experimenter that they would grab the aversive object 
instead (Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2012b).  
Furthermore, experimental research could help us determine whether children 
understand the representational nature behind the iconic gestures they themselves have 
generated. Experimental studies on pretending show that 3.5-year-olds use gesture-like 
actions when the objects they want to pretend with are absent (e.g., pretending to drink 
without a cup being present; Elder & Pederson, 1978; Boyatzis & Watson, 1993). This 
suggests that from 3.5 years children have some understanding of the representational 
nature of iconic gestures. However it is not clear from this study whether children use 
such gestures in a communicative capacity. Experimental research on children’s 
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production of iconic gestures could give insight into whether children are capable of 
generating iconic gestures on their own, and whether they understand both the 
communicative and representational nature of iconic gestures. 
This study investigated whether children can generate their own iconic gestures, 
without watching someone make the gesture beforehand, to request an object with a 
sticker. The idea to request stickers as a goal was derived from a study by Matthews, 
Lieven, and Tomasello (2007). Our first major goal was to determine whether children 
could generate gestures in order to communicate. To make the use of iconic gestures as 
natural for children as possible, and inhibit the use of more common ways to 
communicate (i.e., talking or pointing), the study was set up to make it impossible for 
children to retrieve the sticker through these other means. There were two objects on 
the table of which only one had a sticker attached. The two objects were placed close 
together so that when a child pointed to the desired object it was not clear which of the 
two s/he wanted. Furthermore, the experimenter who was giving the objects was 
wearing headphones and the child was told she was listening to music so she could not 
hear what the child was saying. Therefore gesturing was the only option for children to 
get their message across. If children would generate their own iconic gestures, this 
would indicate that children do indeed understand the communicative nature of iconic 
gestures. 
Another major goal was to determine whether children understand the 
representational nature of their iconic gestures. Children had to generate the correct 
iconic gesture that represented the target object in order to get the sticker. Other iconic 
gestures (e.g., gesturing the other object on the table, or making an arbitrary gesture) 
would not allow them to retrieve the sticker. Therefore a correct iconic gesture would 
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display children’s understanding of the representational link between the iconic gesture 
and the object.  
A secondary aim of the study was to examine whether the types of actions 
generated by children were the result of an automatic motor response. One could argue 
that, upon seeing an object, children have an automatic motor response to perform the 
action in accordance with it, and that when there is no option to perform the action with 
the object itself, it would resemble an iconic gesture (e.g., Tomasello et al., 1999). If it 
were automatic motor activity driving the generation of iconic gestures, one would 
expect to see only representation gestures, in which the gesture type resembles the 
position and action of the hand when using the object. Research by Boyatzis and 
Watson (1993) argues against this possibility. They asked 3- to 5-year-olds to pretend to 
use common objects that were not in the room (e.g., toothbrush). Three- and 4-year-olds 
mostly produced body part gestures, in which they used part of their body to substitute 
the object being represented. This supports the idea that the generation of iconic 
gestures by 3-year-olds is not driven by automatic motor responses, and we expect 
similar results for our study. 
Another secondary aim was to determine whether children’s production of 
gestures might be caused by deferred imitation. Özçalişkan and Goldin-Meadow (2011) 
found that children’s production of gestures was associated with the number of gestures 
produced by parents. Although they did not specify whether the children produced the 
exact same gestures, one could argue that having seen iconic gestures being produced 
by parents increased the chance that children would produce similar gestures. In order 
to find out whether children have a tendency to copy gestures from others, we included 
a model phase in our study. If children do prefer to copy gestures they have seen before, 
we would expect them to imitate the modelled gestures. If they do not imitate the type 
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of modelled gestures (i.e., representation gestures), but instead produce other types of 
gestures (e.g., body part gestures) it would argue against deferred imitation. 
Furthermore, direct imitation of the experimenter’s iconic gesture would show that 
children can imitate the production of an iconic gesture but it could not shed light on 
whether children understand the communicative value of the gesture. However if 
children produce a correct gesture using one of the other gesture types, it would indicate 
that children copied the goal to produce an appropriate gesture.  
A final secondary aim was to determine whether children would use more 
sophisticated gestures when the communicative context was more ambiguous, i.e., 
when the target and distractor objects had similar gesture locations (e.g., toothbrush and 
lipstick) or the iconic gestures of the target and distractor objects looked alike (e.g., 
hammer and shaker). For example, when a cup and a ball are presented together, simply 
pointing to the mouth would be enough to understand which of the two objects the child 
is requesting. However, when a cup and a spoon are presented together, pointing to the 
mouth would not be enough to distinguish between the target and distractor object, and 
the child would have to make a more sophisticated iconic gesture to make clear which 
of the two s/he wanted. Therefore when easy, unambiguous, pairs of objects were 
presented we expected that children would be more likely to use a simple iconic gesture 
(e.g., pointing at correct location), while when difficult, ambiguous pairs of objects 
were presented they would use more sophisticated gestures (e.g., representation). 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
Twenty children participated (13 males, mean age = 42.5 months; range = 40 – 
48 months; SD = 3.3 months). An additional eight children were excluded due to a lack 
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of response during the model phase (5), or experimental error (3). Children were 
recruited from a database of parents that had responded positively to a letter asking their 
child to participate in studies on child development. All children were Dutch.  
3.2.2 Materials 
The apparatus consisted of 22 objects that were familiar to 3-year-olds. They 
were either daily used household objects (e.g., toothbrush, tissue) or objects that were 
frequently used in children’s play (e.g., drum, microphone; see Appendix C, p. 170 for 
a full list of objects). The experimenter who sat next to the child (E1) had two sticker 
trees. These were sheets of paper each showing a picture of a tree which contained 
white circles on which round stickers could be placed. The sticker tree with 3 circles 
was for the experimenter, and the sticker tree with 9 circles was for the child. The 
second experimenter who sat opposite the child (E2) had 12 stickers to give to the child 
and E1. She was wearing large headphones that were covering her ears completely, to 
indicate she could not hear anything that was being said. Next to her was a small table 
containing 18 out of a possible 22 objects. The objects were hidden from the view of 
the child with a cardboard screen that was standing on the same table. 
Two video cameras (brand?) were used to record the child’s and experimenters’ 
behaviour. One camera was directed towards the child and E1. The other camera was 
directed towards E2. See Figure 1 for an overview of the setup. 
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 Figure 1: Overview of the setup of the study. 
 
3.2.3 Design 
A between-subjects design was used. Each trial consisted of two objects being 
presented to the child. In order to find out whether children would use more 
sophisticated gestures when the communicative context was more ambiguous, we 
included easy and difficult object pairs. The object pair was considered easy when the 
iconic gestures representing the objects were very different from each other (e.g., 
glasses and microphone); or difficult, when the iconic gestures looked alike (e.g., 
hammer and shaker), or when the objects were used on a similar part of the body (e.g., 
toothbrush and lipstick). One of the objects had a sticker attached to it using blue tack. 
The object on which the sticker was placed was counterbalanced. 
The study consisted of two phases: a model phase (3 trials) and an extension 
phase (6 trials). The design of a model and extension phase was developed by Hoicka 
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and Akhtar (2011). The model phase allows children to learn the rules of the game and 
it gives the opportunity to investigate children’s ability to produce iconic gestures 
without the necessity to understand the communicative and representational nature of 
the iconic gestures. The extension phase shows us whether children can generate iconic 
gestures without a model and whether they understand the communicative and 
representational nature of iconic gestures. For the model phase, 3 pairs of objects were 
used (see Appendix C, p. 162). wo of the pairs were considered easy, and the third pair 
was considered difficult. The order of objects given to children was counterbalanced, 
although the first trial was always an easy pair. For the extension trials 16 objects were 
used. Each object was paired with an object in an easy and difficult pair (see Appendix 
C, p.162). For example, the hat was paired with a paintbrush in an easy trial, and with a 
hairbrush in a difficult trial. To make sure that no object was presented twice in 
consecutive trials, 16 object pairs were required (8 easy, 8 difficult). Six pairs of objects 
were used for each participant. Difficult and easy pairs were always alternated. The 
order of the objects, the object on which the sticker was placed, and whether the 
extension trials started with an easy or difficult pair were counterbalanced.  
3.2.4 Procedure 
Children came into the lab with one of their parents. The study started with a 
short warm-up in which the child completed a puzzle with E1 who was sitting next to 
the child, while E2 sat on a chair at the side and interacted minimally. Children were 
allowed to sit on their parent’s lap during the warm-up. After the warm up, the parent 
sat approximately 1 meter behind the child (see Figure 1). E1 told the child that they 
would play a fun game in which they could win lots of stickers. She showed the child 
both sticker trees, gave the bigger tree (with 9 circles) to the child and kept the smaller 
one (with 3 circles). E2 then placed two objects close together on the table, out of reach 
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of the child, and performed the actions associated with both objects (e.g., putting the 
glasses on and singing into the microphone) to make sure that the child knew what 
action was associated with the object. E2 made sure that the child was watching while 
she performed the actions. E1 also drew attention to the toys by saying their names and 
pointing in the direction of the toys. Next, E2 placed a sticker on one of the objects. E1 
responded enthusiastically, saying, “Ah, a sticker. I want to have it. I am going to ask 
for the sticker”. She would then ask E2 verbally for the object with the sticker. 
However, because E2 was wearing headphones she could not hear what was being said 
and responded by shrugging her shoulders and looking confused. E1 explained to the 
child, “Oh no, she cannot hear us. We have to ask for the sticker in another way. Why 
don’t we try pointing at the one we want?” She then pointed at the object that had the 
sticker attached to it. E2 would again respond by shrugging her shoulders and looking 
confused. E1 explained, “Oh no, the objects are too close together, so she does not 
understand which one we want. Why don’t we gesture the action of the object and see if 
she understands that.” E1 would then make the iconic gesture that represented the 
object with the sticker. In response E2 smiled and handed the object with the sticker to 
E1. E1 took the sticker from the object, placed it on her sticker tree, and gave the object 
back to E2. E2 placed a new sticker on the same object and E1 said enthusiastically to 
the child, “Now you try!” The child was then allowed to respond. Table 1 displays the 
possible actions performed by the child and the respective responses by E2. E1 
responded to an incorrect response with, “She does not understand. Can you try a 
different way?” If the child did not respond after approximately 15 seconds, E1 would 
prompt the child saying, “How could you show [E2] which object you want?” If the 
child still did not respond after approximately 15 seconds, E1 would say to the child, 
“Do you remember what I did? I was making this gesture, right?” while showing the 
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gesture to the child. When E1 showed the gesture to the child E2 looked away so that 
she would not respond to the gesture performed by E1. If the child remained non-
responsive after approximately 15 seconds, E2 would take the objects away and replace 
them by two new objects. The next two model trials were similar to the first trial, with 
the exception that E1 immediately performed the correct iconic gesture (omitting the 
talking and pointing). 
 After the model phase, E1 showed her sticker tree to the child saying, “Now my 
sticker tree is full, but you still have room for more stickers. Now it’s your turn!” For 
the extension phase (6 trials) the child had to request the object with the sticker without 
any help from E1, that is, E1 never modelled any more gestures. The actions and 
responses by E2 were similar to the model trials. 
 
Table 1: Possible actions by child and E2’s responses to those actions 
Child’s action  E2’s response 
Speaking Shrugged shoulders and looked confused 
Pointing at object Shrugged shoulders and looked confused 
Irrelevant / unclear gesture Shrugged shoulders and looked confused 
Speaking + Pointing at object Shrugged shoulders and looked confused 
Gesture other object on table Gave the other object to the child (taking it 
back if child did not take the toy). 
Correct Gesture 
- Pointing at correct location 
- Action movement 
- Body part gesture 
- Representation 
Smiled and gave the object with the sticker 
to child 
Speaking + Correct gesture Smiled and gave the object with the sticker 
to child 
No Response After 30 seconds of not responding she 
took toys away and started a new trial. 
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3.2.5 Coding 
Children who responded on at least one model trial were included in the final 
analyses. For each trial, the types of actions the child produced were coded (see Table 1 
for an overview of possible actions). Only the last action performed was used for 
analyses, or when E2 had missed a correct gesture (2 trials), the last correct gesture was 
used. Furthermore, it was coded whether the child had performed a correct gesture at 
some point during the trial or not (binomial coding). There were four gesture types that 
counted as a correct gesture: 1) Pointing at correct location; when a child pointed at the 
location in which the object would be used (e.g., teeth for toothbrush, head for hat). 
However, this gesture type only counted as a correct gesture for easy object pairs, when 
pointing at the location was sufficient enough to distinguish between the objects on the 
table. 2) Action movement; when a child performed the movement that one would make 
with the object but nothing else resembled a representation of using the object (e.g., 
hitting the table for drum, moving arm over table for paintbrush). 3) Body part gesture; 
when a child used his/her body as part of the object being gestured (e.g., using hand as a 
shovel, moving the back of the hand over the table and turning hand around as if 
dropping something off the shovel). 4) Representation; when a child performed the 
action the way s/he would do if s/he had the object in hand (e.g., for toothbrush holding 
hand as if holding the toothbrush and moving it in front of mouth).  
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Model trials 
The results showed that children produced a correct gesture on 44 out of 60 
trials (73%). We modelled the likelihood of getting a correct response during a trial 
using logit mixed effect models with the LME4 package (Bates, Maechler, & Dai, 
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2008) in R (R Development Core Team, 2008). According to Jaeger (2008) it is more 
appropriate to analyse repeated-measures categorical data with logit mixed effect 
models, compared to ANOVAs. We first built a base model, which included an 
intercept and Participant and Object as random variables. For all mixed logit models, 
we compared the base model to models including Difficulty (Easy, Difficult), Gender 
(Male, Female), Age Group (Older, Younger), and the interaction between Difficulty 
and Age Group. None of these factors improved the base model for the Model trials. 
The resulting model (log-likelihood = -27.97, N = 60) found children were significantly 
more likely to produce a correct response (correct gesture) during a trial than to give an 
incorrect response (OR = 115.7, p = .005).  
In the model phase, children were able to imitate a modelled iconic gesture 
performed by E1. This gesture was always a representation gesture type, in which E1 
used her body the way she would when she would actually perform the action with the 
target object. Out of the 44 correct gesture responses, children imitated the 
representation gesture type on 6 trials (14%), and used another gesture type (either 
pointing at correct location, action movement, or body part gesture) on 38 trials (86%). 
Logit mixed effect models were run on the correct gestures only. We compared the base 
model to the previous independent variables, as well as (crucially) gesture type 
(Representation, Other). Children were significantly more likely to produce one of the 
other gesture types than to copy the representation gesture type (log-likelihood = -17.15, 
N = 44; OR = 8.65, p < .001). This indicates that children copied the goal to perform an 
iconic gesture, rather than blindly mimicking the modelled gesture. 
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Table 2: number of trials in which children responded, separately for each 
behavioural response, and percentage of the total number of trials (N = 105) 
in which a certain response was given. Only the last response of the child of 
each trial was taken into account. 
Behavioural response Number of trials % of total  
number of trials 
Speaking 15 14.3 
Pointing at object 2 1.9 
Speaking + Pointing at object 0 0.0 
Showing 1 1.0 
Irrelevant / unclear gesture 3 2.9 
Gesture other object on table 0 0.0 
Correct Gesture 
- Pointing at correct location 
- Action movement 
- Body part gesture 
- Representation 
74 
0 
26 
28 
20 
70.5 
0.0 
24.8 
26.7 
19.0 
Speaking + Correct gesture 0 0.0 
No Response 10 9.5 
 
3.3.2 Extension trials 
Children performed 105 extension trials in total. Table 2 shows the number of 
times each behaviour was performed over all 105 trials. Children performed a correct 
gesture on 74 trials (71%). We modelled the likelihood of giving a correct response 
during a trial using logit mixed effect models. We first built a base model, which 
included an intercept and Participant and Object as random variables. We built our 
model as in the Model trials. None of the factors improved the base model. The 
resulting model (log-likelihood = -36.38, N = 105) found children were significantly 
more likely to give a correct response (correct gesture) during a trial than to give an 
incorrect response (OR = 37.08, p = .0335).  
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Fourteen out of 20 children performed a correct gesture on at least one of the 
trials, χ2 (1) = 3.20, p = 0.074. Out of the 6 children who did not perform a correct 
gesture, 4 of them did not complete all extension trials (3 children completed 2 trials, 1 
child completed 3 trials). 
3.3.2 Correct Gesture Types 
We investigated whether children tended to use one gesture type more often 
than other types. Only the 14 children who actually performed correct gestures were 
analysed (10 males, mean age = 42.9 months; range = 40 – 48 months; SD = 3.5 
months). A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was used with Gesture Type as the 
within-subject variable and 3 levels (action movement, body part gesture, and 
representation). The gesture type ‘Pointing at correct location’ was not included in the 
analysis because children never used this gesture type in the extension phase. No 
differences of Gesture Type were found, F (2,26) = 0.641, p = 0.535, indicating that 
there was no preference for the use of a specific gesture type. Age Group and Gender 
did not affect this result. 
Only one child performed one gesture type for all trials, while 5 children 
performed two gesture types, and 8 children performed all three gesture types. Children 
were more likely to use two or more different gesture types, χ2 (1) = 10.286, p = 0.001.  
 To find out whether children would use a specific type of gesture to 
communicate about certain objects, we investigated how many gesture types were 
performed for each object. Three objects (Drum, Pen, and Soap) elicited only one type 
of gesture, while 9 objects elicited two types of gestures, and 4 objects elicited all three 
types of gestures. These results suggest that children were more likely to use two or 
more different gesture types rather than using a specific gesture type to communicate 
about an object, χ2 (1) = 6.250, p = 0.012.  
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 It is possible that children attuned the gesture type they produced dependent on 
how similar the iconic gestures of the object pairs were (Difficulty). In that case we 
would expect children to perform more sophisticated gesture types (i.e., body part 
gesture, representation) and less easy gesture types (i.e., location indication, action 
movement) on the difficult object pair trials, compared to the easy object pair trials. We 
modelled the likelihood of performing a sophisticated gesture type during a trial using 
logit mixed effect models. We first built a base model, which included an intercept and 
Participant and Object as random variables. We compared the base model to models 
including Difficulty (Easy, Difficult), and the interaction between Difficulty and Age 
Group (Young, Old). None of these factors improved the base model. The resulting 
model (log-likelihood = -44.97, N = 105) found children were significantly more likely 
to perform a sophisticated gesture type than to perform an easy gesture type (OR = 2.46, 
p = .0244). This indicates that children did not attune their gestures specifically to how 
similar the iconic gestures of the object pairs were, but were overall using more 
sophisticated iconic gestures to communicate. 
3.4 General Discussion 
The results show that children generated iconic gestures on most extension trials 
to communicate with the experimenter. The majority of the iconic gestures generated 
(97.3%) represented the target object, confirming our predictions that children 
understand the communicative and representational nature of iconic gestures. Previous 
literature showed that children from around 26 months old understand that other people 
use iconic gestures in a communicative way (Namy, 2008; Namy & Waxman, 1998; 
Namy et al., 2004; Tomasello et al., 1999). Our results extend this literature as the 
children in our study generated iconic gestures themselves in order to communicate. 
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Therefore children not only understand that others can use gestures to communicate, but 
are able to take advantage of this communication form themselves. 
Children’s understanding of the representational nature of iconic gestures 
develops around 26 months when they are more likely to associate iconic gestures with 
specific objects (Namy & Waxman, 1998; Namy et al., 2004), but it is not until 3 years 
of age that they really seem to understand the iconicity of gestures (Tolar et al., 2008). 
Our results showed that children generated iconic gestures to refer to a specific target 
object, rather than generating arbitrary gestures, a gesture for the wrong object, or no 
gestures at all. This suggests that from 3.5 years, children not only understand the 
representational nature of gestures, but can use this representational understanding to 
create their own appropriate gestures. 
Furthermore, previous work has shown that children generate iconic gestures in 
a natural setting (e.g., Acredolo & Goodwyn, 1988; Özçalişkan & Goldin-Meadow, 
2011), which implies that children understand the association between iconic gestures 
and their referents. The results of our study extend this literature by demonstrating 
children’s cognitive understanding of the communicative and representational nature of 
iconic gestures. It gives support for the idea that children in the naturalistic settings may 
understand the communicative and representational nature of iconic gestures as well, 
although one must take into account that most naturalistic studies involve younger 
children, therefore their cognitive abilities might still be limited. 
3.4.1 Imitation 
 It is possible that children did not generate their own iconic gestures, but instead 
imitated previously seen gestures (i.e., deferred imitation). Although this possibility 
cannot be ruled out, it seems highly unlikely that all iconic gestures generated by the 
children relied on this method. First of all, the results showed that in the model trials, 
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when they had the option to imitate an experimenter who modelled an iconic gesture, 
children did not use direct imitation. Instead of producing the identical gesture 
(representational gesture), they generated a different gesture type 86% of the time (a 
combination of action movement and body part gestures). If children are not likely to 
imitate gestures that were presented to them a few moments beforehand, it seems 
unlikely that they would use deferred imitation to guide their iconic gesture production 
in the extension trials.  
Second, not all objects presented are well known for being common gestures 
(e.g., watering can, harmonica). This makes it highly unlikely that children will have 
seen all iconic gestures for the objects in the extension trials, such that they would 
produce all gestures using deferred imitation. 
Future research could use novel objects to rule out the possibility of deferred 
imitation. However we chose to use familiar objects because children’s ability to 
generate iconic gestures for well-known objects may be influenced by their previous 
knowledge about the objects. Poggi (2008) argues that in order to generate iconic 
gestures we select the features to imitate based on their distinctiveness and their ease to 
be represented by hands. One could therefore argue that children would be better at 
generating iconic gestures for familiar objects because they are familiar with the actions 
performed with the objects and therefore are better able to decide what the distinctive 
feature of the object is to include in their iconic gesture.  
3.4.2 Automatic Motor Responses 
It may also be argued that children did not generate their own iconic gestures, 
but instead demonstrated automatic motor responses. However if it were the case that 
children produced gestures based on the motor memory of what to do with that object, 
one would expect children to only produce representation gestures. However during the 
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model trials, children mostly produced gestures that were not representation gestures; 
instead they mostly used action movement and body part gestures. Additionally, during 
the extension trials children generated representation gestures only a third of the time – 
in equal proportion to their generation of action movement and body part gesture types. 
For the action movement and body part gesture types, children position their hand 
differently than what they would do when using the object. This indicates that children 
do not rely on automatic motor activation to generate iconic gestures. This is confirmed 
by previous studies which show that children use different gestures types when 
producing iconic gestures (e.g., Acredolo & Goodwyn, 1988; Boyatzis & Watson, 
1993).  
3.4.3 Different Types of Iconic Gestures 
When looking at the correct gestures children performed, children did not show 
a preference for a certain gesture type. Although pointing at the correct location was 
never performed in the extension trials, the other three gesture types (action movement, 
body part gesture, and representation) were generated equally. This is contradictory to 
findings by Boyatzis and Watson (1993) who found that 3- and 4-year-olds mainly 
produced body part gestures. Our findings suggest that children have more plasticity in 
the use of iconic gestures, such that children decide per trial which gesture type is best 
to use. 
However, children did not adjust their iconic gestures based on how much the 
objects on the table necessitated similar or different gestures. Children used more 
sophisticated gestures (body part gesture, representation) than easy gestures (location 
indication, action movement), irrespective of whether the object pair was easy of 
difficult. This indicates that 3-year-olds have the capacity to make sophisticated 
gestures and suggests that they prefer these over easy gestures. One possible 
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explanation for this could be that 3-year-olds understand that the sophisticated gestures 
are more iconic and therefore less likely to be confused for another gesture, and that it 
will be more likely for the receiver to understand the message correctly if they make a 
more sophisticated gesture. 
Finally, the objects themselves did not dictate the types of gestures that children 
generated. Objects have certain physical affordances that young children can detect 
(Bourgeois, Khawar, Neal, & Lockman, 2005), lending themselves to specific actions. 
However it does not appear to be the case that objects have any type of “gesture 
affordances” which bias children to use one gesture type over another. 
3.4.4 Conclusion 
 In this paper we presented the first experimental study to investigate children’s 
ability to generate their own iconic gestures in order to communicate to others. The 
results showed that 3.5- to 4-year-olds are indeed able to generate their own iconic 
gestures to represent a target object in order to retrieve a sticker. These results 
corroborate previous literature which shows that children understand the 
communicative and representational nature of iconic gestures. Importantly, this research 
also extends the previous literature by demonstrating that children can make use of their 
understanding of the communicative and representational nature of iconic gestures in 
the same way as adults do; namely to use them as a means to communicate with others. 
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Abstract 
Previous studies on children’s ability to generate object substitution actions are limited 
in that they cannot confirm whether children understand the representational nature of 
object substitution (i.e., using an object ‘as if’ it is something else). Alternative 
explanations to children’s ability to generate pretend actions in these studies are that 
they use imitation or specific prompts from the experimenter to guide their actions. The 
key aim of this paper was to investigate children’s ability to generate object substitution 
actions without help from others. Second, their ability to differentiate an experimenter’s 
intentions to pretend or to try and perform a genuine action was investigated. In Study 
1, 45 3- and 4-year-olds were either presented with pretend actions, accompanied by 
cues to state the intention to pretend, or trying actions, accompanied by cues to state the 
intention to perform a genuine action. Children successfully differentiated between the 
experimenter’s intentions, and generated more object substitution after pretend actions 
had been modelled in previous trials. The results extend previous research by 
confirming children’s understanding of the representational nature of object substitution 
and their ability to generate object substitution actions. Study 2 replicated these findings 
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with 34 3-year-olds, but in addition found no relationship between children ability to 
generate object substitution actions and divergent thinking, inhibitory control, or the use 
of object substitution during free play. This contradicts previous literature, for which 
possible explanations are discussed. 
Keywords: Pretend Play; Object Substitution; Divergent Thinking; Inhibitory Control; 
Naturalistic; Observational 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Pretend play differs from other types of play in the sense that the actions 
performed during pretend play are technically ‘wrong’. For example, drinking from a 
cup that is empty, walking around with a stuffed toy dog that is not really alive, or 
soothing a baby doll that is not really crying. Sometimes children also substitute one 
object for another (e.g., pretending that a banana is a phone). Object substitution 
requires the ability to temporarily suppress the original action that fits the object while 
performing the action of the object you are substituting it for. Children as young as 2 
years are shown to use object substitution during pretend play (Fein, 1981; McCune-
Nicolich, 1981; Vig, 2007). However, it is not clear from these studies whether these 
children really understand the representational aspects of their own use of object 
substitution; that is whether they really use the object ‘as if’ it is the other object. Also, 
it is not clear whether, when another person performs an object substitution action, 
children really understand that this person does the ‘wrong’ action intentionally. This 
study sought to investigate both questions by investigating children’s ability to generate 
pretend actions, and their ability to interpret an experimenter’s intentions to pretend 
using object substitution. 
Chapter 4: Generating pretend actions using object substitution 
______________________________________________________________________   
103 
 
Children’s pretend play develops during the first years of life. Before their first 
birthday children mainly physically manipulate objects, while they learn how to use the 
objects properly (McCune-Nicolich, 1981). Around 12 months, children start using 
normal actions in a playful way, for example drinking from a cup that is empty. This is 
called auto symbolic play (McCune-Nicolich, 1981; Vig, 2007). Auto symbolic play 
further develops by using others (e.g., dolls) to do similar play actions (around 18 
months; McCune-Nicolich, 1981; Vig, 2007), followed by making sequences of play 
actions (during the second year; McCune-Nicolich, 1981; Vig, 2007). The final stage 
develops towards the end of the second year and into the third year. During this stage 
children are less object driven, and internally direct what to play. For example, children 
decide beforehand what they want to play and then search for the objects that go with 
that play scenario. During this stage they are also starting to show the ability to 
substitute objects for others (Fein, 1981; McCune-Nicolich, 1981; Vig, 2007).  
4.1.1 Generation of object substitution actions 
Naturalistic research suggests that children perform object substitution actions 
in a free play setting from the age of two (e.g., Belsky & Most, 1981; McCune-
Nicolich, 1981; McCune, 1995). However these studies only mention the incidences of 
object substitution and do not provide any information on the content of their play. 
Therefore, it is hard to tell whether children’s object substitution actions are generated 
by themselves or whether they are copied from others (immediately after observation or 
using deferred imitation). If the latter were the case one cannot know for sure whether 
children were really representing the substituted object, which is argued to be the case 
(Vig, 2008). Experimental studies suggest that children under 3 years still rely on the 
substituted object being similar to the pretend object (Elder & Pederson, 1978). For 
example, they use a straw to represent a spoon, or a tissue to represent a blanket. This 
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suggests that children still rely on physical similarities between the object present and 
the pretend object, and therefore might not fully display representational abilities. 
Experimental research suggests that children understand and produce object 
substitution actions from around 3 years (e.g., Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Wyman, 
Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2009). Harris and Kavanaugh (1993, experiment 2) presented 
children with pretend play scenarios in which they substituted blocks for other objects. 
First the experimenter performed a pretend action (e.g., feeding a toy monkey a banana, 
in which the banana was a yellow block), after which the child was asked to perform 
the same action (“You give the monkey some banana”). Most children successfully 
produced an object substitution action (they brought the yellow block to the monkey’s 
mouth). However, similar to the naturalistic research, we cannot rule out that children 
simply imitated the experimenter’s actions without really understanding the 
representational aspect of object substitution.  
In a follow-up study, children were introduced to a pretend play scenario, but 
the exact action which the child had to perform was not modelled (Harris & 
Kavanaugh, 1993, experiments 3 and 4). For example, the experimenter pretended to 
pour tea into an empty cup containing a popsicle stick. He then handed the cup to the 
child and said, “Show me how you stir Teddy’s tea with the spoon”. Most children 
successfully performed this action, thereby showing that children did not require a 
model to perform object substitution.  
The downside of this study and similar studies that investigate children’s ability 
to generate pretend actions (e.g., Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano, 2004; Rakoczy & 
Tomasello, 2006) is that experimenters gave prompts to children to generate specific 
pretend actions. For example, Harris & Kavanaugh (1993) asked specifically to show 
how to stir, or, in an attempt to decrease the amount of lexical information given, they 
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asked to “show what Teddy does with a spoon”. These cues might have prompted a 
child to perform a stirring action (because that is what one does with a spoon) without 
necessarily representing the popsicle stick as a spoon. 
In addition, the pretend scenario itself might have prompted children to give a 
specific response without really understanding the representational aspects of the 
pretend actions. For example, the fact that the popsicle stick was already in the cup 
when being handed to the child might have prompted an automatic motor response from 
the child to stir the stick in the cup. Also, the objects used for object substitution were 
chosen for their resemblance in shape to the substituted object (e.g., a popsicle stick as a 
spoon, or a piece of paper as a towel) which limits the necessity to use representative 
abilities.  
In summary, although naturalistic and experimental research suggests that 
children around 3 years understand and generate object substitution actions, they cannot 
rule out children’s reliance on imitation or on verbal and behavioural prompts to 
generate these actions. Therefore, this study sought to investigate whether children can 
generate object substitution actions without providing a model or giving specific verbal 
and behavioural prompts. 
4.1.2 Understanding intentions behind object substitution 
An essential skill behind understanding pretence is to understand that the person 
who is pretending is intentionally doing something ‘wrong’. Rakoczy, Tomasello, and 
Striano (2004) showed that 3-year-olds understood the intentionality behind pretending 
when using auto symbolic pretend play (i.e., using the original object to pretend with). 
They showed children either a person pretending to do an action or trying to do an 
action correctly but failing to do so (e.g., writing with a pen that still had the cap on). 
The difference between the two groups was that in the pretend group the experimenter 
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showed verbal and non-verbal cues to indicate it was his intention to pretend (e.g., 
playful expression, making sound effects). These verbal and non-verbal cues were 
similar to the cues mothers gave to their children when pretending to eat a snack in a 
more naturalistic setting (Lillard, 2006). On the other hand, in the trying group he 
showed verbal and non-verbal cues to indicate it was his intention to perform the 
genuine action (e.g., frustrated expression, stating surprise by saying, “Hmmm?”). They 
found that 3-year-olds imitated the pretend actions while correcting or trying to correct 
the trying action (e.g., taking the cap off the pen before colouring). 
Explicit verbal instructions can aid children’s understanding of pretending. 
During a training phase, Rakoczy, Tomasello, and Striano (2006) told one group of 
children explicitly that a person was ‘pretending to’ or ‘trying to’ do a certain action 
before doing the pretend or trying actions. Another group of children only received 
implicit cues that the person was pretending or trying (e.g., pretending a shoe was a 
cup, while saying, “this is her cup and she is drinking”), and a third group received no 
specific pretend training. When 3-year-olds were asked whether an action performed 
was pretending or trying during test trials, they were more likely to give a correct 
response when they received the explicit training than when they received the implicit 
training or no training. This suggests that providing children with the direct association 
between the pretend action and the word ‘pretending’ aids children in their 
understanding of the intentionality of these actions. 
We were interested to see whether, and if so how, children understood the 
intentions behind pretending when using object substitution. In Study 1 we investigated 
whether children could distinguish between an experimenter’s pretend and trying 
actions. We used similar verbal and non-verbal cues to distinguish between the pretend 
and trying actions as in Rakoczy et al. (2004). Furthermore, we compared children in an 
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explicit and implicit group to further investigate the effect of explicit instructions on 
children’s ability to use object substitution. In congruence with Rakoczy et al. (2004), 
we expected that children would pretend after the experimenter performed a pretend 
action, and would perform a correct action with the object after the experimenter 
performed a trying action. 
4.1.3 The influence of Divergent Thinking and Inhibitory Control on 
children’s ability to generate object substitution actions 
The ability to generate novel pretend actions without a model is thought to 
require additional skills to what a child would require to understand others’ pretend 
actions. One skill that might be important in the generation of novel pretend actions is 
divergent thinking, i.e. the ability to think of multiple uses for an object. Through 
exploration, some children are able to think of many uses for an object while others 
only perform a few actions (Bijvoet-van den Berg & Hoicka, Chapter 2). Children’s 
divergent thinking skills have been linked to children’s imagination abilities during 
pretend play. Russ, Robins, and Christiano (1999) found that fantasy and imagination in 
pretend play predicted divergent thinking. Wyver and Spence (1999) initially found no 
correlation between children’s divergent thinking scores and how much they pretended 
with objects. However, they did find that when children received training in thematic 
play, in which children use activities and themes in their pretend play that are remote 
from those encountered by the child in their everyday live, children’s divergent thinking 
scores increased. Also, when children received training in divergent thinking their 
frequency of thematic play behaviour increased. This suggests that children’s divergent 
thinking skills are related to children’s ability to think beyond what is normal to their 
everyday life. This ability to think beyond what is normal might help children during 
the generation of object substitution actions as well. During object substitution, one has 
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to think beyond the normal use of the object and instead project the use of a different 
object onto it. Therefore, divergent thinking might be related to children’s ability to 
generate object substitution actions. 
Another skill that might be important in the generation of novel pretend actions 
is inhibitory control. Inhibitory control is the ability to suppress or delay an impulsive 
response when a task calls for it (Carlson & Moses, 2001). This skill seems important 
when using object substitution, where you need to inhibit the original action performed 
with an object and perform the pretend action instead. In the past, children’s lack of 
pretence in autism has been explained by a difficulty to inhibit initial responses (Harris, 
1993). This means that when children were for example presented with a hammer and 
asked to pretend it was something else, they found it difficult to inhibit the initial 
response to use the hammer in the original way and therefore failed to perform the 
pretend action. In normally developing children, inhibitory control has also been linked 
to children’s symbolic play skills (Kelly, Dissanayake, Hammond, & Ihsen, 2011). 
Study 2 sought to further investigate the relationship between divergent thinking, 
inhibitory control and the ability to generate object substitution actions. 
4.1.4 Comparing experimental and naturalistic research 
A final aim of this paper was to investigate whether the results from our pretend 
experiment were comparable to children’s pretend play behaviour in a naturalistic play 
setting. Most studies on pretend play focus either on investigating specific abilities 
using experimental designs (e.g., Onishi, Baillargeon, & Leslie, 2007; Rakoczy et al., 
2004, 2006; Wyman, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2009) or detecting more overall 
developmental patterns of pretend play using naturalistic settings (e.g., Belsky and 
Most, 1981; Howes & Matheson, 1992; Lillard & Witherington, 2004; Wyver & 
Spence, 1999), but rarely have these two designs been assessed together. It is important 
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to study these two designs together to get a better picture of how individual differences 
in specific abilities relate to differences in naturalistic play behaviour.  
An exception is the study by Kelly et al. (2011). In this study, spontaneous 
pretend play of children aged between 4 and 7 years old was assessed in a 20-minute 
unstructured free play with 15 functionally specific toys (e.g., toy truck) and junk items 
(e.g., cardboard box). Symbolic play acts constituted both auto symbolic and object 
substitution acts. Children’s ability to engage in three different types of pretend play 
(one of which was object substitution) was assessed using the Test of Pretend Play 
(ToPP; Lewis & Boucher, 1997). In this test pretend play was modelled for the child to 
copy. Furthermore, children were verbally instructed to carry out specific play actions 
or perform novel pretend play. They found that children’s ability to imitate pretend 
actions was correlated to the percentage of time they spent pretending during free play. 
In Study 2, we investigated whether the amount of time 3-year-olds spent pretending, 
and specifically performing object substitution actions during free play, was related to 
their ability to generate object substitution actions in an experimental setting. 
4.2 Study 1 
Study 1 sought to investigate whether children were able to generate object 
substitution actions without the help of an experimenter. In addition, children’s 
understanding of an experimenter’s intentions to pretend or perform a genuine action 
was investigated. The hypothesis was that children who saw an experimenter perform 
pretend actions during the first trials (model phase), and understood that it was the 
experimenter’s intention to pretend, would generate their own novel pretend acts in the 
consecutive trials when no modelling occurred (extension phase). On the other hand, 
children who saw an experimenter perform trying actions during the first trials, and 
understood it was the experimenter’s intention to do the correct action with the object, 
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were expected to continue performing genuine actions with the objects in the 
consecutive trials. Finally, in order to find out whether explicit verbal cues would 
enhance children’s generation and understanding of pretend actions (e.g., Rakoczy et 
al., 2006), we compared the responses of children who received these explicit cues 
(explicit group) to children who did not receive these cues (implicit group). 
4.2.1 Method 
4.2.1.1 Participants 
Forty-five 3- and 4-year-olds (19 males, mean age = 44.7 months; range = 38 - 
51 months; SD = 3.8 months) were randomly assigned to one of four groups: Implicit 
Pretending (12), Implicit Trying (11), Explicit Pretending (11), and Explicit Trying 
(11). Children were of similar ages across conditions. Most of the children were British 
and Caucasian. Eighty-six per cent of parents reported their education level. Parents had 
attained secondary education (17.8%), an undergraduate degree (24.4%), or a 
postgraduate degree (44.4%). Participants were recruited through local nurseries, the 
Glasgow Science Centre, the Edinburgh Zoo, and through posters and playgroups. 
4.2.1.2 Materials 
The apparatus consisted of 18 objects that were familiar to 3-year-olds. They 
were either daily used household objects (e.g., toothbrush, phone) or objects that were 
frequently used in children’s play (e.g., drum, ball; see Appendix D, p. 171, for a full 
list of objects). Pictures of the object were also used. All objects were photographed 
against a white background. The photos were cropped and their brightness and contrast 
adjusted manually to decrease the influence of shadows (See Appendix E, p. 173, for 
the pictures of all objects). The colour pictures were printed in pairs on A4 sheets of 
paper and laminated. Two digital camcorders (SONY handycam) were used to record 
the responses of the child. One camcorder was placed just behind the experimenter to 
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record the child’s responses from the front. The other camcorder recorded the child’s 
responses from the side. 
4.2.1.3 Design 
The study consisted of a 2 (Condition: Pretend, Trying) x 2 (Group: Explicit, 
Implicit) between-subjects design. All children (in both Implicit and Explicit groups) 
were given non-verbal cues to make the intentions of the experimenter clear. In the 
Pretend condition the non-verbal cues were: a positive facial expression, looking back 
and forth from the object to the child, and producing sound effects that were illustrative 
for the pretend object. In the Trying condition the non-verbal cues were: a confused 
facial expression, looking continuously at the object, and stating confusion by saying, 
“Hmmm?” In addition, in the Explicit group children were given clear verbal cues to 
state the goal/intention of the task (e.g., “Now can you pretend?” in the pretend 
condition, or “Now can you try and use it?” in the trying condition). In the Implicit 
condition, these verbal cues were not given.  
The task consisted of two parts: 4 familiarization trials followed by 8 test trials. 
The familiarization trials were used to familiarize children with the task, and to check 
whether children could imitate object substitution actions (pretend action trials) as well 
as conventional uses of objects (real action trials). The test trials were divided into two 
phases: a model phase (4 trials), followed by an extension phase (4 trials), based on the 
design developed by Hoicka and Akhtar (2011) to test children’s joke generation, and 
used by Bijvoet-van den Berg, Liszkowski, and Hoicka (see Chapter 3) to test 
children’s generation of iconic gestures. The model phase allowed children to learn the 
rules of the game and it gave the opportunity to investigate children’s understanding of 
the intentionality of pretend acts. The extension phase on the other hand investigated 
whether children could generate their own pretend acts without any help from others. 
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There were four possible orders in which the objects could be presented (see Appendix 
D, p. 171), and these were counterbalanced across all children. 
4.2.1.4 Procedure 
After a short warm-up, the child was sat opposite the experimenter at a small 
children’s table. The experimenter placed a folder, containing all laminated A4 sheets 
with pictures, on the side of the table but within reach of the child. The experimenter 
placed a bag of toys, out of view from the child, next to her on the floor.  
Familiarization Trials 
The experimenter took out one of two objects (a toy car or a tub with a lid) and 
showed it to the child. She asked the child to name the object and showed a picture in 
the folder. In the real action trials the picture was identical to the object on the table, 
while in the pretend action trials the picture was different to the object on the table (e.g., 
picture of the tub when the car was on the table). In total, the familiarization part 
consisted of 4 trials (performing a real action and a pretend action with both objects). 
The real action was always performed first, followed by the pretend action, although it 
varied whether the car or tub actions were performed first.  
The actions were identical for all children, but the verbal cues were different for 
the Implicit and Explicit Group (see Table 1a for an overview of the cues given to both 
groups). In the Implicit Group, the verbal cues given were identical in all 4 trials. The 
experimenter stated her intention to use the object like the picture in the folder, by 
saying “Let’s use the [object] like this”. She pointed at the object when saying the 
object’s name and pointed at the picture in the folder when saying the word ‘this’. The 
experimenter then used the object as if it was the object in the picture (e.g., driving the 
car around in circles on the table like a car in the real action trials, or ‘driving’ the tub 
around in circles on the table like a car in the pretend action trials). After that, she gave 
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the object to the child and said, “Now you try!” During the child’s response the 
experimenter smiled at the child, irrespective of the action the child performed. She did 
not correct any incorrect actions and responded with “Alright!” after the child had 
played with the object for a few seconds. She then took back the object and turned over 
a page in the folder to present the next picture. 
In the Explicit Group, the verbal cues given were different for the real and 
pretend action trials. In the real action trials, the experimenter stated her intention to use 
the object like the picture in the folder, by saying “Let’s try and use the [object] like 
this”. In the pretend action trials on the other hand, she said, “Let’s pretend that the 
[object] is this”. The actions performed were identical to the Implicit Group. After the 
experimenter performed the action, she reinforced her intentions by saying, “There!” in 
both the real and pretend trials. She then gave the object to the child and said, “Now 
you try!” The experimenter’s behaviour during the response of the child was identical 
to the Implicit Group.  
Table 1a) Intentional verbal cues given in the familiarization trials, separately for the 
Explicit and the Implicit groups. 
Implicit Group Explicit Group 
Pretend action trials Real action trials Pretend action 
trials 
Real action trials 
Stating initial intention: 
“Let’s use the 
[object] like this” 
“Let’s use the 
[object] like this” 
“Let’s pretend that 
the [object] is this” 
“Let’s try and use 
the [object] like 
this” 
Reinforcing intention after action: 
No reinforcement No reinforcement “There! “There!” 
Prompting child to respond: 
“Now you try!” “Now you try!” “Now you try!” “Now you try!” 
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Table 1b) Intentional verbal cues given in the test trials, separately for the Explicit and 
Implicit groups. 
Implicit Group Explicit Group 
Pretend Condition Trying Condition Pretend Condition Trying Condition 
Stating initial intention: 
“Let’s use the 
[object] like this” 
“Let’s use the 
[object] like this” 
“Let’s pretend that 
the [object] is this” 
“Let’s try and use 
the [object] like 
this” 
Reinforcing intention after action: 
“You see? I was 
using it like this” 
“Whoops! I was not 
using it like this” 
“There! You see? I 
was pretending it 
was this” 
“Whoops! I did it 
wrong. I was not 
using it like this” 
Prompting child to respond (Model Phase): 
“Now you try!” “Now you try!” Now can you try 
and pretend?” 
“Can you try and 
use it?”  
Prompting child to respond (Extension Phase): 
“Now you try!” “Now you try!” Now can you try 
and pretend? What 
could you pretend it 
is?” 
“Can you try and 
use it? How would 
you use it?” 
 
Test Trials: Model Phase 
While children in the familiarization trials were presented with one object and 
one picture at the same time, during the test trials children were presented with one 
object and two pictures. One of the pictures was identical to the object on the table. The 
second was a picture of an object that was very different in function and shape from the 
object on the table. Different procedures were used for the Pretend and Trying 
conditions.  
Pretend Condition. The Implicit and Explicit Group were again given different 
verbal cues (see Table 1b for an overview of the cues given to both groups). In the 
Implicit Group, the experimenter stated her intention to use the object like the picture 
that was different from the toy in her hand (target picture), by saying, “Let’s use the 
[object] like this”. When saying the word ‘this’ she pointed at the target picture. The 
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experimenter then performed the action that one would perform with the toy in the 
target picture (e.g., using a ball as a cup), while making sound effects that were 
appropriate for the target object (e.g., making slurping sounds; see Appendix F, p. 174, 
for the actions and sound effects performed for each object). The experimenter 
performed the action twice, waiting 2 seconds between the actions while looking at the 
child with a positive facial expression (but not laughing). She reinforced her intention to 
pretend by saying, “You see? I was using it like this.” After that, she gave the object to 
the child and said, “Now you try!” The experimenter’s behaviour during the response of 
the child was identical to the familiarization trials. 
In the Explicit Group, the experimenter stated her intention to use the object like 
the target picture by saying, “Let’s pretend that the [object] is this”. After performing 
the pretend action (identical to the Implicit Group), she reinforced her intention to 
pretend by saying, “There! You see? I was pretending it was this” and prompted the 
child to respond by saying, “Now can you try and pretend?” 
Trying Condition. The Trying condition was identical to the Pretend Condition, 
except that the target picture to which the experimenter pointed when saying the word 
‘this’ was the one identical to the object in her hand. Crucially, the experimenter 
performed exactly the same action as she did in the Pretend Condition (e.g., using the 
ball as a cup). However, instead of looking at the child with a positive facial expression 
during the action, she would look at the object with a confused facial expression and 
said, “Hmmm?” as if she did not understand what was going wrong.  
In the Implicit Group, the experimenter stated her intentions by saying, “Let’s 
use the [object] like this”. After performing the wrong (trying) action she said, 
“Whoops! I was not using it like this. Now you try!” In the Explicit Group the 
experimenter started by saying, “Let’s try and use the [object] like this.” and responded 
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to doing the wrong action by saying, “Whoops! I did it wrong. I was not using it like 
this. Can you try and use it?”  
Test Trials: Extension Phase 
The Extension trials were identical to the Model trials, except that the 
experimenter did not model any of the actions. After presenting the child with the 
object and the two pictures, the experimenter immediately asked the child to act upon 
the object. In the Implicit Group she said, “Now you try!” In the Explicit Group, she 
said in the Pretend Condition, “Now can you pretend? What could you pretend it is?” 
and in the Trying Condition, “Now can you try and use it? How would you use it?” 
Please note that the experimenter did not prompt the child as to how to use the object, 
i.e., she did not point to either picture. 
4.2.1.5 Coding 
For each trial it was coded whether the child performed an action corresponding 
to the actual object (real response), an action corresponding to the object in the other 
picture (pretend response), or neither. For the Familiarization trials, children were 
divided into two groups: a group of children who responded correctly on all 4 trials, and 
a group of children who responded incorrectly on at least one of the trials. For the 
Model and Extension Phases the number of real responses and the number of pretend 
responses were calculated separately. For each child this resulted in a score for the 
number of pretend responses during both the Model Phase and Extension Phase, and the 
number of real responses for both the Model Phase and Extension Phase. All scores had 
a possible range from 0 to 4. Inter-rater agreement on 15% of the videos was very good 
(Cohen’s kappa = .822). In order to run a repeated-measures ANOVA, children were 
split according to age into a Young group and an Old group, using a median split 
(median age = 44 months). 
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4.2.2 Results 
Following Rakoczy et al. (2004) and Rakoczy and Tomasello (2006), we 
computed difference scores. For both conditions (Pretend and Trying Condition) and for 
both phases (Model and Extension Phase), the number of real responses was subtracted 
from the number of pretend responses. This yielded a score from -4 to 4, with positive 
scores indicating that children mainly gave pretend responses, while negative scores 
indicated that children mainly gave real responses. 
By calculating difference scores one should be aware that any information about 
the number of trials in which children responded with neither pretending nor real 
actions was lost. For example, a child that performed three pretend actions and one real 
action in the pretend condition would get a difference score of 2. However, a child that 
performed only two pretend actions and did not respond on the other two trials would 
also get a difference score of 2. In order to see how big a problem this might be for our 
sample, we checked how many children performed a real or pretend response on all 
trials. In the Model Phase, 88.9% of the children performed a real or pretend response 
on all trials, compared to 80% in the Extension Phase. This indicates that, although 
there are some children who performed other behaviours, the majority of children 
showed a pretend or real response on all trials. Therefore, we believed it was acceptable 
to continue using the difference scores. 
Figure 1 displays the mean number of pretend and real responses performed 
during the Model Phase (Figure a) and the Extension Phase (Figure b), as a function of 
Group and Condition. A repeated-measures ANOVA was run, with Phase (Model, 
Extension) as a within-subjects variable, and Condition (Pretend, Trying) and Group 
(Implicit, Explicit) as between-subject factors. Initial analyses showed no effects of Age 
Group (all F’s < .282, all p’s > .585), Gender (all F’s < 1.753, all p’s > .193), nor 
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whether children had performed successfully on all Familiarization trials or not (all F’s 
< 2.232, all p’s > .143). Therefore, they were taken out of the final analyses. 
a) Model Phase b) Extension Phase 
Figure 1: Mean number of responses for which children pretended or performed a real 
response as a function of Group (Implicit/Explicit) and Condition (Pretend/Trying), 
separately for the Model Phase (figure a) and the Extension Phase (figure b). 
 
Significant main effects of Condition, F(1,41) = 31.159, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .432, 
and Phase, F(1,41) = 63.717, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .608, were found. These main effects 
indicated that children performed overall more pretend responses in the Pretend 
Condition than in the Trying Condition, t(43) = 5.533, p < .001, r = .645, and more 
pretend responses in the Model Phase than in the Extension Phase, t(44) = 6.570, p < 
.001, r = .704. Furthermore, an interaction of Condition x Phase, F(1,41) = 16.443, p < 
.001, ηp
2
= .286, was found. To explore the difference in responses within this 
interaction, the difference scores from the Extension Phase were subtracted from the 
Model Phase to reveal the change in scores between Model and Extension Phase, 
separately for the Pretend Condition (mean change = 4.52) and the Trying condition 
(mean change = 1.45). The positive mean change in scores in both conditions indicated 
that for both the Pretend and Trying Conditions, children performed more pretend 
responses during the Model Phase than during the Extension Phase. However the 
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change in scores from Model to Extension Phase was larger for the Pretend Condition 
than the Trying Condition, t(42.120) = 3.827, p < .001, r = .508. This suggests that 
children in the Trying condition were more likely to keep on performing real responses, 
while children in the Pretend Condition started to perform more real responses in the 
Extension Phase, compared to the Model Phase. 
An interaction of Group x Phase was also found, F(1,41) = 8.706, p = .005, ηp
2
= 
.175. To explore the difference in responses within this interaction, similar change 
scores as above were calculated. Both change scores for the Implicit Group (mean 
change = 4.13) and the Explicit Group (mean change = 1.86) were positive, indicating 
that both groups gave more pretend responses in the Model Phase than the Extension 
Phase. However the change in scores from the Model to Extension Phase was larger for 
the Implicit Group than the Explicit Group, t(40.560) = 2.640, p = .012, r = .383. This 
suggests that the children in the Explicit Group were more likely to keep pretending in 
the Extension Phase than children in the Implicit Group. 
4.2.2.1 Planned Comparisons 
Planned comparisons were carried out to investigate the influence of explicit 
instructions on children’s ability to distinguish intentions (Model Phase), and their 
ability to generate object substitution actions (Extension Phase). A 2(Group) x 
2(Condition) ANOVA on the difference scores for the Model Phase revealed no main 
effect of Group, F(1,41) = 1.222, p = .275, ηp
2
= .0.29, and no interaction of Condition x 
Group, F(1,41) = .387, p = .537, ηp
2
= .009. Children were able to distinguish the 
intentions of the experimenter, both in the Implicit Group, t(16.767) = 3.817, p = .001, r 
= .682, and in the Explicit Group, t(20) = 5.560, p < .001, r = .779.  
  A 2(Group) x 2(Condition) ANOVA on the difference scores of the Extension 
Phase revealed a main effect of Group, F(1,41) = 4.314, p = .044, ηp
2
= .095, and a 
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marginally significant interaction of Condition x Group, F(1,41) = 3.246, p = .079, ηp
2
= 
.073. Further analyses indicated that children in the Implicit Group did not generate 
more object substitution actions in the Pretend Condition compared to the Trying 
Condition, t(21) = 1.001, p = .328, r = .213. However, children in the Explicit Group 
did generate more object substitution in the Pretend Condition compared to the Trying 
Condition, t(20) = 2.532, p = .020, r = .493. 
4.2.3 Discussion 
4.2.3.1 Generation of object substitution actions 
 The results of Study 1 revealed that children generated more pretend actions in 
the Pretend Condition than in the Trying Condition. In the Extension Phase, when 
children had no model to respond to nor did they receive specific prompts, children 
generated their own object substitution actions when they understood it was the goal of 
the game to pretend, but only after receiving explicit instructions. Previous literature 
suggested that children were able to generate pretend actions around three years of age 
(e.g., Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006). Our results extend 
previous literature by ruling out the possibility that the pretend actions of children were 
the result of imitation or prompts to do a specific action in order to perform a pretend 
action. 
 The explicit instructions to pretend or to try and use the object genuinely helped 
children to decide how to respond when they had no model to rely on (Extension 
Phase). Children gave more pretend responses when they were given explicit 
instructions to pretend than when they did not receive these instructions. This suggests 
that providing children with the direct association between the pretend action and the 
word ‘pretending’ in the Model Phase, helps children understand what to do in the 
Extension Phase. Rakoczy et al. (2006) found that children were more likely to give 
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correct responses after receiving explicit training to pretend using auto symbolic play. 
Our results extend this literature and indicate that explicit instructions aid children’s 
ability to generate object substitution actions as well.  
4.2.3.2 Understanding the intentions behind object substitution 
During the Model Phase, children differentiated between trials in which the 
experimenter showed the intention to pretend (Pretend Condition) in comparison to 
trials in which the experimenter showed the intention to do a genuine action (Trying 
Condition). Children corrected the mistakes an experimenter made, while imitating the 
pretend acts. These results resemble the findings of Rakoczy et al. (2004) on auto 
symbolic play, and extend previous literature indicating that children understand the 
intention to ‘do wrong’ when using object substitution. 
However, children did not need explicit instructions to understand how to 
respond to the experimenter’s behaviour in the Model Phase. Children who received 
explicit instructions to pretend or perform a genuine action responded equally well as 
children who did not receive those instructions. These results contradict the findings by 
Rakoczy et al. (2006) who found that children who received explicit instructions were 
also better at understanding the intentionality behind pretending. One possible reason 
why we did not find any differences is that the children in the Implicit Group were 
already responding according to ceiling level in the Pretend Condition. When looking at 
the mean number of actions in Figure 1a both Implicit and Explicit groups performed 
on average 3.5 pretend responses in the Model Phase. Therefore the explicit instructions 
might not have added anything to children’s understanding of the intentionality of 
pretending.  
Another possible explanation mentioned previously by Hoicka & Akhtar (2011) 
is that children responded differently to the two conditions based on the different 
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emotion cues given rather than the underlying intentions. Children might have 
responded to the positive facial expression of the experimenter in the Pretend Condition 
by imitating her behaviour, while avoiding or correcting the actions associated with the 
frustrated, negative, facial expression in the Trying Condition.  
4.3 Study 2 
For Study 2 we were interested to find out what factors might influence children’s 
ability to generate pretend acts. We hypothesized that children’s divergent thinking 
skills would have an effect on their ability to generate new actions. Given that children 
with high divergent thinking skills are better at finding multiple uses for an object, these 
children were hypothesized to generate more pretend responses during the Extension 
Phase of the Pretend Condition than children with low divergent thinking skills. 
Second, we expected children’s inhibitory control to have an effect on children’s 
responses in both the Model and Extension Phases of the experiment. The expectation 
was that children with low inhibitory control would find it difficult to inhibit the 
original action that belonged to the object. Therefore, we hypothesized that children 
with low inhibitory control would perform more real responses overall than children 
with high inhibitory control.  
Third, we were interested to find out whether children’s performance on the 
Pretend Experiment was related to the amount of children’s object substitution during 
free play. We expected a positive relationship between the two. We were also interested 
to investigate the factors that might have an effect on children’s object substitution 
during free play. It was hypothesized that divergent thinking skills and inhibitory 
control would be positively related to the amount of Object Substitution a child would 
display during the free play session.  
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4.3.1 Method 
4.3.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-four 3-year-olds (19 males, mean age = 42 months; range = 36 - 48 
months; SD = 3.8 months) participated. One child (female, 42 months) was 
unresponsive during the free play session and therefore excluded from analyses 
involving free play. Most children were British and Caucasian. Fifty-three per cent of 
parents reported their education level. Parents had attained secondary education 
(11.8%), an undergraduate degree (17.6%), or a postgraduate degree (23.5%). 
Participants were recruited as in Study 1. 
4.3.1.2 Measures 
Pretend experiment 
 The materials, procedure and coding of the pretend experiment were identical 
to Study 1. Two digital video camcorders (SONY Handycam) were used to record the 
behaviour of the child during all tasks. Cameras were placed as in Study 1. 
Unusual Box Test (Divergent Thinking) 
Divergent thinking was assessed using the Unusual Box Test. The materials and 
procedure used for the Unusual Box test are described in Bijvoet-van den Berg and 
Hoicka (see Chapter 2). The child was presented with the Unusual Box, a wooden box 
with an open top containing several different features (e.g., rings, stairs, hole), which 
was placed on a turn table. The experimenter showed all the features on the box while 
turning the box. After the child was given a chance to turn the box as well, the 
experimenter gave the child the first out of five novel objects (egg holder, spatula, 
feather roller, Kong rubber toy, and hook). The child was given 90 seconds to play with 
the object, after which s/he was given a new object to play with. The experimenter sat 
on the side and interacted minimally with the child. 
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The behaviour of the child was coded for all five trials. Each trial started the 
moment the child took the object from the experimenter and lasted 90 seconds. 
Divergent thinking scores were calculated by counting the number of different actions 
that the child performed for all trials combined (5 x 90 seconds). Actions were recorded 
on two features: what type of action was performed (e.g., hit, place) and what part of 
the box was used during the action (e.g., stairs, rings). One action might be rolling one 
of the objects on the stairs. Another action might be hitting the side of the box with one 
of the objects. Actions performed with only the box or object, using hands to 
manipulate either, were also counted as actions. Performance of the same action with 
different objects was counted as the same action. Children were divided into a Low and 
High Divergent Thinking group using a median split (median score = 25). 
Day-Night task (Inhibitory Control) 
Inhibitory control was assessed using the Day-Night task (Gerstadt, Hong, & 
Diamond, 1994). Fourteen laminated A5 pictures were used. Half of them showed a 
cartoon drawing of a yellow sun on a light blue background. The other half showed a 
white moon and four stars on a black background. The experimenter started with two 
practice trials in which she explained the rules of the game, namely that when presented 
with a moon card the child had to respond with the word ‘day’. On the other hand, 
when presented with a sun card the child had to respond with the word ‘night’. Two 
practice trials were given in which the experimenter presented a sun and a moon card. If 
the child responded incorrectly, the experimenter would explain the rules again and 
give another two practice trials. After that, 14 test trials (7 sun cards and 7 moon cards) 
were presented to the child in a pseudorandom order (for the exact order, see Gerstadt et 
al., 1994). The experimenter always asked, “What do you say for this one?” but no 
other feedback was given. 
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The child’s answers were written down by the experimenter during the task, and 
afterwards coded for being correct or incorrect. A correct answer was when a child said 
‘day’ when presented with a moon card, and ‘night’ when presented with a sun card. 
Any other responses were counted as incorrect. Children were divided into a Low and 
High Inhibitory Control group using a median split (median score = 8). 
Free Play 
For the free play task, the child was told that the experimenter was interested in 
seeing how well s/he could play on his/her own. This was to inhibit the child’s desire to 
play together with the experimenter. The experimenter sat on a table at the side (approx. 
2 meters away) and acted busy. Thirty-six toys (or toy parts) were used, divided equally 
over three sessions of free play. Half of the toys were of indiscriminate shape and 
function whereas the other half were functionally specific. The toys of indiscriminate 
shape and function were included to allow for object substitution. Figure 2 displays the 
toys used for each session. The toys were presented to the child on a plastic tray 
(approx. 30x40cm).  
The child was given up to 5 minutes to play with the toys, with a minimum play 
time of 2 minutes. If the child clearly stated after 2 minutes that s/he was finished 
playing with the toys, the experimenter would take the tray with the toys away and 
replaced the toys with new ones. During the task, some children found it hard to play on 
their own and were constantly trying to interact with the experimenter or parent by 
going up to them and thereby moving out of view of the camera. To avoid that play 
behaviour was not observable in these cases, the experimenter moved closer to the child 
so that the child would stay seated at the table (this was the case for 3 children). The 
experimenter still acted busy and avoided interacting with the child.  
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The child’s behaviour during the free play sessions was coded using The 
Observer XT. Each session started when the experimenter placed the tray with toys on 
the table and removed her hands from the tray. A hierarchical system was used to code 
the child’s behaviour, based on the Exploratory Behavior Scale (EBS) by Van 
Schijndel, Franse, and Raijmakers (2012). Similar to the EBS, the lowest behaviour 
level was passive contact, followed by active manipulation. For the purpose of this 
study, the highest level of the EBS (exploratory behaviour) was replaced by the 
behaviour level clear pretending. A distinction was made between auto symbolic 
pretend play, in which the child used the object for its original purpose in a pretend-like 
fashion (e.g., pretending to pour tea from a teapot); and object substitution, in which a 
child pretended that an object was something else (e.g., pretending that a stick was a 
spoon).  Behaviour that seemed to be pretend behaviour, but could not be conclusively 
coded as such was not considered clear pretending and left out of the analyses. 
Appendix G (p. 177) gives a short description of the levels in the correct hierarchical 
order, and examples of children’s behaviour. The child’s behaviour was coded during 5 
second intervals. The length of the intervals was determined on the basis of the 
approximate time it took children to execute pretend behaviour during the free play 
sessions. Following Van Schijndel, Franse, and Raijmakers (2012), the highest level of 
behaviour that a child demonstrated per time interval was coded. For example, when 
within one interval a child actively manipulated and clearly pretended with an object, 
that interval was coded as clear pretending. A maximum number of 180 intervals were 
coded (60 intervals per session x 3 sessions). The frequency of intervals that children 
spent in active manipulation, auto symbolic play, and object substitution were used for 
analyses
1
. 
                                                 
1
 Not all children completed 180 intervals (N = 10). When children clearly stated they were finished 
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A) Pretend Session  B) Functional Session 
C) Combined Session 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Toys used for the three sessions of free play. A) Pretend session – 
Functionally specific toys: stuffed toy animal dog and rabbit, teapot with lid, cup and 
saucer. Indiscriminate function toys: three sponges of different shapes, three closed-off 
tubes with ridges. B) Functional session - Functionally specific toys: xylophone, 
hammer, shape sorter with lid, two blocks (heart and flower shape) that fit in the shape 
sorter. Indiscriminate function toys: two round shaped pegs and a block to place them 
in, three Duplo blocks. C) Combined session – Functionally specific toys: bucket, 
shovel, fish-shaped sand shaper, two miniature plastic dolls (a lady and a little girl). 
Indiscriminate function toys: shoe lace, three plastic cotton reels, three wooden blocks 
of different shapes (rectangle, round and rainbow shape). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
playing, the session was stopped. Initially, we controlled for the variance in number of intervals by 
dividing the frequency of behavior by the total number of play intervals. However, no differences in 
analyses were found when using this measure. Therefore, for simplicity, we continued using frequency 
instead of relative frequencies.  
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4.3.1.3 Design 
This study was a within-subjects design in which each child completed all tasks. 
Unlike the pretend experiment in Study 1, children completed both the Trying and 
Pretend conditions, but on different days. For the 21 children who participated in their 
nursery, the tasks were administered in four sessions (the Day-Night task was 
administered together with one of the other tasks). The other 13 children completed the 
tasks in two sessions, for convenience of the parents who brought the children to the 
lab. The 4 counterbalanced testing orders are shown in Table 2. The Pretend condition 
was deliberately not combined with the free play session or the Trying condition, to 
avoid that the child’s behaviour in the pretend condition would influence his/her 
behaviour on the other tasks or vice versa. 
The orders of the objects used for the pretend experiment are displayed in 
Appendix D (p. 171). Children were never presented with the same objects in the 
Pretend and Trying conditions. When order 1 was presented to the child in the Pretend 
condition, they received order 4 in the Trying condition, or vice versa. Similarly, when 
order 2 was presented in the Pretend condition, they received order 3 in the Trying 
condition, or vice versa. For the Unusual Box test, the order of objects given to children 
was counterbalanced, following Bijvoet-van den Berg & Hoicka (see Chapter 2). For 
the free play session, the toys were given in three possible orders (Order 1: Pretend (P) 
– Functional (F) – Combined (C); Order 2: F – C – P; Order 3: C – P – F), which were 
counterbalanced across children.  
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Table 2: Order of tasks in Study 2; children who came into the lab with their parents 
performed the first tasks (above the line) during the first session and the other tasks 
(below the line) during the second session. Children who participated in their nursery 
performed all tasks on separate occasions. The Day-Night task was administered 
during the same session as another task. 
Order 1 Order 2 Order 3 Order 4 
Pretend Condition 
Unusual Box Test 
Day-Night task 
---- 
Trying Condition 
Free Play 
Unusual Box Test 
Pretend Condition 
Day-Night task 
--- 
Free Play 
Trying Condition 
Free Play 
Trying Condition 
--- 
Unusual Box Test 
Pretend Condition 
Day-Night task 
Trying Condition 
Free Play 
---- 
Pretend Condition 
Unusual Box Test 
Day-Night task 
 
4.3.2 Results 
4.3.2.1 Pretend Experiment 
Figure 3 displays the mean number of pretend and real responses as a function 
of Condition and Phase. For the statistical analysis, we again calculated difference 
scores similar to the analysis in Study 1. For each child, for both conditions (Pretend 
and Trying Condition) and for both phases (Model and Extension Phase), the number of 
real responses was subtracted from the number of pretend responses. This yielded a 
score from -4 to 4, with positive scores indicating that children mainly performed 
pretend responses, while negative scores indicated that children mainly performed real 
responses. 
A 2 (Condition) x 2 (Phase) repeated-measures ANOVA was run, with 
Inhibitory Control (High, Low) as a between-subject factor. Initial analyses showed no 
effects of Age Group (median age  = 42 months; all F’s < 3.095, all p’s > .088) or 
Gender (all F’s < 1.633, all p’s > .210), therefore they were taken out of the final 
analyses. 
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A significant main effect of Condition was found, F(1,31) = 45.262, p < .001, 
ηp
2
= .594, with children performing more pretend responses in the Pretend Condition 
(mean difference score = .60) than in the Trying Condition (mean difference score = -
2.46; t(33) = 6.750, p < .001, r = .762). Furthermore, a significant main effect of Phase, 
F(1,31) = 38.750, p < .001, ηp
2
= .556, indicated that children performed more pretend 
responses in the Model Phase (mean difference score = .32) than in the Extension Phase 
(mean difference score = -2.18; t(33) = 6.579, p < .001, r = .753). The analysis revealed 
no interaction effects, nor any effects of Inhibitory Control (all F’s < .624, all p’s > 
.436). 
4.3.2.2 Planned Comparisons 
Planned comparisons were carried out to investigate children’s ability to 
distinguish between intentions (Model Phase) and their ability to generate object 
substitution actions (Extension Phase). Repeated-measures ANOVA (comparing 
Pretend and Trying conditions) on the difference scores for the Model Phase revealed a 
main effect of Condition, F(1,33) = 40.165, p < .001, ηp
2
= .549. This indicated that 
children distinguished the intentions of the experimenter such that they performed more 
pretend actions during the Pretend Condition (mean difference score = 2.06) compared 
to the Trying Condition (mean difference score = -1.41), t(33) = 6.338, p < .001, r = 
.741. 
Repeated-measures ANOVA on the difference scores of the Extension Phase 
revealed a main effect of Condition, F(1,33) = 20.811, p < .001, ηp
2
= .387. Children 
were found to generate more object substitution actions in the Pretend Condition (mean 
difference score = -.85) compared to the Trying Condition (mean difference score = -
3.50), t(33) = 4.562, p < .001, r = .622. 
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Figure 3: Mean number of responses for which children pretended or performed a real 
response as a function of Condition (Pretend/Trying) and Phase (Model/Extension). 
 
4.3.2.3 Generating pretend actions, divergent thinking, and inhibitory control 
We further investigated whether children’s ability to generate pretend acts in the 
Extension Phase of the Pretend Condition was related to Divergent Thinking, Inhibitory 
Control, the number of intervals during free play in which children performed Object 
Substitution or Auto Symbolic pretend play, and the number of intervals in which they 
performed Active Manipulation. For this analysis, children were split into two groups 
based on whether children had performed at least one pretend response (N =19) during 
the Extension Phase of the Pretend Condition or not (N = 15). The same procedure was 
used to divide children who performed Object Substitution during at least one interval 
(N = 17) and children who never performed Object Substitution during free play (N = 
16). Table 3 shows the results for each variable. None of these variables were related to 
children’s ability to generate pretend acts.  
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Table 3: Analyses for the relationship between children’s ability to generate object 
substitution actions during the extension phase of the pretend condition and divergent 
thinking, inhibitory control, frequency of object substitution, auto symbolic pretending, 
and active manipulation during free play, age, and gender. 
Variable Mean 
Difference
1 
t χ2 Df p 
Divergent Thinking -.544 .255  32 .801 
Inhibitory Control   .022 1 .881 
Free Play (N = 33)      
  Object Substitution   .259 1 .611 
  Auto Symbolic Pretending -3.33 .914  31 .368 
  Active Manipulation 13.60 1.667  31 .106 
Age .242 .183  32 .856 
Gender   1.266 1 .260 
1
Positive mean difference scores indicate higher scores for children who did generate object substitution 
actions 
 
4.3.2.4 Free play, divergent thinking, and inhibitory control 
Table 4 shows the results for the differences in divergent thinking, inhibitory 
control, age and gender between children who performed object substitution during at 
least one interval and children who never performed object substitution. No differences 
were found in any of these variables. Exploratory analyses were performed for those 
children who performed Object Substitution during at least one interval (N = 17; 10 
males; mean age = 42 months; range = 36 – 48 months; SD = 4.2 months). In this 
subset, the number of intervals in which children performed Object Substitution was 
positively correlated to the originality scores of the Unusual Box test (Spearman’s r = 
0.487, p = 0.047). This indicates that children who generated more original novel 
actions also performed more Object Substitution actions. No significant correlations 
were found between the number of intervals in which children performed Objects 
substitution actions and the fluency scores of the Unusual Box test (Spearman’s r = 
0.411, p = 0.101), nor inhibitory control (Spearman’s r = 0.090, p = 0.731). 
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Table 4: Analyses for the relationship between children’s generation of object 
substitution during free play and divergent thinking, inhibitory control, frequency of 
object substitution, auto symbolic pretending, and active manipulation during free play, 
age, and gender. 
Variable Mean 
Difference
1 
t χ2 Df p 
Divergent Thinking 2.588 1.267  31 .215 
Inhibitory Control   .000 30 .982 
Age .320 .236  31 .815 
Gender   .022 1 .881 
1
Positive mean difference scores indicate higher scores for children who did generate object substitution 
actions 
 
4.3.3 Discussion 
Study 2 replicated the results found in the Explicit Group of Study 1. Children 
overall produced more pretend actions in the Pretend Condition than in the Trying 
condition, and generated their own object substitution actions when they understood it 
was the goal of the game to pretend. Children also distinguished the intentions of the 
experimenter between the Pretend and Trying conditions. 
Children’s divergent thinking skills and inhibitory skills were not related to their 
ability to generate object substitution actions during the pretend experiment, nor to the 
amount of object substitution they performed during free play. These results contradict 
previous literature reporting a relationship between pretend play behaviour and 
divergent thinking (e.g., Russ et al., 1999; Wyver & Spence, 1999), as well as between 
pretend play behaviour and inhibitory control (Kelly et al., 2011). Exploratory analyses 
did show that of the children who performed object substitution actions during free play 
the amount of object substitution they used in their play was positively correlated to the 
originality scores of divergent thinking. This suggests that children who are able to 
come up with more original actions using divergent thinking might also be more likely 
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to use objects in more original ways by using object substitution during free play. 
Future research is needed to further investigate this relationship. 
It is interesting to note that out of the children who did not generate any object 
substitution actions in the pretend experiment, still half of these children showed object 
substitution during free play. Similarly, out of the children who did generate any object 
substitution during the pretend experiment, still half of the children did not generate 
object substitution actions during free play. This indicates that children’s inability to 
generate object substitution actions in an experimental settings does not necessarily 
mean that they do not show object substitution in a free play setting, or vice versa. 
4.4. General Discussion 
4.4.1 Generation of Object Substitution actions 
The two studies described in this paper showed children’s ability to generate 
object substitution actions without the use of a model or specific prompts. The results 
from both studies dismiss the possibility that children’s pretend responses were caused 
by imitating the experimenter (e.g., Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Wyman, Rakoczy, & 
Tomasello, 2009) or through prompting a specific pretend action (e.g., Harris & 
Kavanaugh, 1993; Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano, 2004; Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006). 
By performing the action of the target picture, 3-year-olds displayed their understanding 
of the representational nature of pretence. This means that they understood that they can 
use an object ‘as if’ it is something else.  
Our findings provide a better understanding of the cognitive abilities of children 
when engaged in pretend play. While previous experimental research suggested that 
children understood the intentions behind other’s pretend play (Rakoczy, Tomasello, & 
Striano, 2004; Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006) and could respond to an experimenter’s 
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pretend actions by also pretending (e.g., Harris & Kavanaugh, 1992; Rakoczy, 
Tomasello, & Striano, 2004), this research indicates that children can generate pretend 
actions in the same way as adults do, that is by representing an object as something else 
and using the object in that way. 
When children were shown pretend actions in the Model Phase (Pretend 
Condition), they were also more likely to generate object substitution actions in the 
Extension Phase. This is in line with the finding by Nielsen and Christie (2008) that 
adult modelling facilitates children’s production of object substitution actions. In this 
study children played with a dollhouse and different toys: small dolls, toy items that 
were placed in the dollhouse (e.g., bed, couch), replica objects (e.g., toy hamburger, toy 
soft drink), and miscellaneous functional items (e.g., string, piece of cloth). After a 
short 4-minute free play session, the experimenter modelled three play scenarios in the 
dollhouse, all of which contained object substitution with one of the miscellaneous 
functional items (e.g., using the piece of cloth as a towel). After modelling children 
were allowed another 4-minute free play. Children performed on average more pretend 
actions in the post-modelling phase compared to the pre-modelling phase. Furthermore, 
around half of the actions performed were imitated from the experimenter, while the 
other half were novel object substitution actions. Their explanation for children’s novel 
action production was that children might have used the modelled acts of pretence as a 
foundation for the generation of their own pretend actions. In our experiment this seems 
an improbable explanation since the objects presented in the Extension Phase were 
unrelated to previously presented objects. Therefore it is unlikely that the previously 
performed actions could have guided children’s generation of novel pretend actions.  
An alternative explanation to children’s increased generation of pretend actions 
is that instead of extending the use of the same pretend actions, they extended the 
Chapter 4: Generating pretend actions using object substitution 
______________________________________________________________________   
136 
 
higher intention or goal of the game which was to pretend in the Pretend Condition, 
while performing a genuine action in the Trying Condition. This idea converges with 
findings that children create novel jokes after an experimenter modelled joking actions 
(Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011), or generating novel iconic gestures after being shown models 
of iconic gestures on distinct objects (Bijvoet-van den Berg, Liszkowski, & Hoicka, 
Chapter 3). In all these studies, children take into account the higher-order goal of the 
game (i.e., to generate pretend actions, jokes, or iconic gestures) and apply this goal to 
new situations. 
The finding that children performed on average more pretend actions during the 
Model Phase compared to the Extension Phase suggests that children find it easier to 
produce object substitution actions after someone else modelled the action than when 
they have to generate these actions on their own. This is congruent with previous 
findings that children produce more pretend actions after being shown a pretend model 
(e.g., Fiese, 1990; Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano, 2006). One possible explanation is 
that responding to someone else’s pretend actions by imitating the same action requires 
fewer cognitive skills than when children have to think of their own object substitution 
action. In addition, pretend play is often a social encounter (Shim, Herwig, & Shelly, 
2001). Therefore, children might find it easier to affiliate with someone else who is 
pretending and engage in pretend play than when they have to generate these actions 
without someone else joining in. 
4.4.2 Understanding intentions behind object substitution actions 
Both naturalistic and experimental research has focused on the question as to 
whether children understand that, while pretending, adults are intentionally performing 
a ‘wrong’ action. In a naturalistic setting parents were found to give specific cues to 
indicate they were pretending (e.g., exaggerated movements, sound effects; Lillard, 
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2006). When in an experimental setting experimenters used similar cues to indicate 
their intention to pretend, 3-year-olds distinguished between auto symbolic pretend 
actions (e.g., writing with a pen that has the cap still on) and trying actions (when the 
experimenter intended to do a genuine action; Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano, 2004).  
The present studies indicate that 3-year-olds understand the intentions behind 
object substitution actions as well, and that they differentiate these intentions from the 
intention to do a genuine action (but accidentally performing a wrong action). Our 
results resembled the findings by Rakoczy, Tomasello, and Striano (2004), suggesting 
that children are good at understanding the intentions behind both auto symbolic play 
and object substitution. The extra difficulty of having to suppress the initial motor 
response during object substitution does not seem to expunge children’s ability to 
understand intentions behind pretend play. 
4.4.3 Divergent thinking 
The ability to think of multiple uses for an object (divergent thinking) seemed to 
have no effect on how good children were in generating object substitution actions. One 
possible reason for this is that we gave children a specific target picture to use as their 
pretend object. Therefore, children were limited in what they could pretend the object in 
hand would be. So in a way divergent thinking skills were not necessarily required for 
generating the pretend action. This could explain why we did not find a relationship 
between pretend play and divergent thinking while other studies, which investigated 
children’s imagination skills (Russ et al., 1999) or the ability to use themes in their 
pretend play that are remote from those encountered by the child in his/her everyday 
live (Wyver & Spence, 1999), did. 
We also found no relationship between divergent thinking skills and how much 
pretend play children displayed during free play. Because children were not restricted to 
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generate specific object substitution actions during free play, they were not constrained 
in their use of divergent thinking as compared to the pretend experiment. However, it 
might be that the incidences of object substitution found during free play did not 
necessarily require elaborate divergent thinking skills. When looking at the types of 
object substitution actions performed, on most occasions the object being substituted 
resembled the pretend object in shape or function. For example, the red bendy stick was 
often used to represent a spoon to stir with. On another occasion, children pretended 
that the blue sponge was a catapult, which, given the elastic qualities of the sponge, was 
not a difficult association. Therefore, it is possible that the object substitution actions 
performed during free play did not necessarily require divergent thinking skills, hence 
no relationship between divergent thinking and object substitution during free play was 
found.  
The finding that divergent thinking might be related to some forms of 
pretending (e.g., imagination, thematic play) while not to other forms (e.g., object 
substitution) suggests that not all pretend play necessarily requires divergent thinking. 
For example, in studies that did find a relationship between pretend play and divergent 
thinking (e.g., Russ et al., 1999; Wyver & Spence, 1999), children’s pretend play was 
not restricted to using objects but could be based on what children were saying or doing 
(e.g., pretending to fly a spaceship). It may be that the use of objects decreases the need 
for divergent thinking because the shape and form of the object already offered children 
a framework to build their pretend play on.  
Future research could focus on what specific qualities of pretend play scenarios 
are enhanced by children’s divergent thinking skills. The relationship between 
divergent thinking and the ability to generate object substitution actions could be further 
investigated by giving children multiple options for how they could substitute the object 
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(e.g., presenting multiple pictures). Regarding naturalistic research, it might be a good 
idea to observe children’s behaviour when all the objects are of indiscriminate function. 
The fact that half of the objects were functionally specific might have guided children 
in a certain direction that led to the small variation in the type of object substitution 
actions. When none of the objects have a prescribed function, children’s divergent 
thinking skills might indeed be of influence to children’s ability to generate object 
substitution. 
4.4.4 Inhibitory Control 
Inhibitory control was found to have no effect on children’s ability to generate 
object substitution actions, either in an experimental or naturalistic settings. This seems 
counterintuitive, given that the main skill to object substitution seems to be to inhibit 
the original use of the object in order to do the action of the target object. It also 
contradicts previous findings that inhibitory control is related to children’s symbolic 
play skills (Kelly et al., 2011). 
Gerstadt et al. (1992) mentioned in their discussion that the Day-Night task 
might not be suitable for 3-year-olds. In their study a large number of children failed the 
practice trials, in which children did not respond correctly to the cards even right after 
specific instructions as to what to say were given. They suggested that children’s 
inhibitory control was so low that even when told specifically what to say they found it 
hard to inhibit the initial response. Indeed, we also found that half of the children in our 
sample did not respond correctly on all practice trials. This suggests that the Day-Night 
task might not have been an appropriate test to assess inhibitory control in 3-year-olds. 
The Day-Night task was chosen for this study because it requires a child to 
inhibit an initial response in order to give an alternative response. Alternative measures 
of inhibitory control in young children include assessing children’s ability to inhibit the 
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urge to peek when an experimenter is wrapping a gift for the child (Kochanska, Murray, 
Jacques, Koenig, & Vandegeest, 1996), or respond to the instructions of one character 
while inhibiting the instructions of another (Bear-Dragon task, Reed, Pien, & Rothbart, 
1984). However, these measures only require a child to inhibit a response but they do 
not require a child to give an alternative response (i.e., the correct response is no 
response).  Therefore, the Day-Night task was thought to be more suitable to compare 
to children’s ability to generate object substitution actions. Future research could 
investigate whether children’s ability to generate object substitution actions is related to 
other measures of inhibitory control. 
4.4.5 Experimental vs. Naturalistic setting 
Our results indicate that children’s ability to generate actions in an experimental 
setting do not relate to their pretend behaviour in a naturalistic setting. Half of the 
children who successfully generated object substitution actions in the pretend 
experiment performed no such actions during free play. In contrast, half of the children 
who did not generate any object substitution actions in the pretend experiment did 
perform this type of actions during free play. This contradicts the findings by Kelly et 
al. (2011) who did find a positive relationship between experimental and naturalistic 
pretend play. However, in the Kelly et al. study the free play session always followed 
the experimental task. It could therefore be that children were more focused on pretend 
play because it was stimulated in the previous task which in return might have caused 
children to generate more pretend play than what they would normally do.  
The most logical explanation for our findings is that when children are able to 
generate object substitution actions in an experimental setting, this does not necessarily 
mean that they will display this ability in their free play. On the other hand, children’s 
responses in an experimental setting might not reflect their full ability to display certain 
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behaviour, given that we found that children did show object substitution in the free 
play setting while they did not show such behaviour in the pretend experiment. 
Although it is hard to find a solution for this phenomenon, it is important to be aware of 
it, especially when working with young children. These results further suggest we 
should be careful to interpret findings from experiments as being reflective as to how 
children would respond in a naturalistic setting. Future studies should take into account 
the possible discrepancy between experimental and naturalistic behaviour and attempt 
to conduct more studies in which experimental and naturalistic behaviour are directly 
compared. 
4.4.6 Conclusion 
The results from these studies suggest that 3-year-olds are able to generate their 
own object substitution actions. They do not require a model or specific prompts from 
an experimenter to do so. Explicit instructions that emphasize the goal to pretend or try 
to perform genuine actions further aids children’s ability to generate object substitution 
actions. In addition, children differentiate between an experimenter’s intentions to 
pretend or to try and perform a genuine action. However, children’s ability to generate 
object substitution actions was not related to their divergent thinking skills, inhibitory 
control, nor how much they displayed object substitution during free play.  
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Chapter 5 
General Discussion 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
The aim of this thesis was to gain information about children’s ability to 
generate actions without getting input from others. Three different settings were chosen 
to offer a varied investigation of children’s ability to generate actions: (1) generating 
multiple actions with novel objects, (2) generating iconic gestures in order to 
communicate, and (3) generating pretend actions using object substitution. Before 
discussing the findings more generally and the implications of these findings for the 
broader field, the results of each chapter are briefly summarized. 
5.1.1 Generating multiple actions with novel objects (Chapter 2) 
In order to assess children’s ability to generate multiple actions with novel 
objects, the Unusual Box test was developed. As the Unusual Box test assessed 
children’s ability to think beyond one action and search for multiple possibilities to use 
an object, the test was argued to measure divergent thinking as well. Study 1 assessed 
the validity of the Unusual Box test as a measure of divergent thinking, and individual 
differences in the number of actions performed (fluency) in 3- and 4-year-olds. The 
fluency scores on the Unusual Box test were positively correlated to two existing 
measures of divergent thinking, i.e. the Instances subtest of the Wallach and Kogan 
tests of creativity (Wallach & Kogan, 1965) and Thinking Creatively in Action and 
Movement (TCAM; Torrance, 1981). Therefore, the Unusual Box test was argued to be 
a valid measure of divergent thinking. A range of fluency scores was found (8 – 34 
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actions) indicating individual differences in children’s ability to generate multiple 
actions with novel objects. 
Study 2 assessed the test-retest reliability of the Unusual Box test, as well as the 
chance to use this test in children younger than 3 years. Sixteen 2-year-olds were 
assessed twice two weeks apart on the Unusual Box test. A strong positive correlation 
was found between children’s fluency scores on the two assessments, indicating high 
test-retest reliability. Individual differences in fluency scores (10-32 actions) and the 
absence of a floor effect indicated that the Unusual Box test is usable in children as 
young as 2 years of age. When the data of both studies were combined, a positive 
correlation between age and fluency scores was found, indicating that children get 
better at generating multiple actions with increasing age.  
5.1.2 Generating iconic gestures in order to communicate (Chapter 3) 
Children’s ability to generate iconic gestures without the help of others was 
assessed using a game to request stickers from an experimenter. In order to get a sticker 
children had to communicate to the experimenter which out of two objects they wanted 
(only one object had a sticker attached to it). Children were not able to communicate 
through speech because the experimenter was wearing headphones, nor through 
pointing because the two objects were placed close together. A correct iconic gesture 
required the child to create a gesture that represented the object requested, in such a 
way that the experimenter could distinguish which of the two objects the child desired. 
Children generated a correct iconic gesture on 71% of the trials. The odds ratio 
indicated that children were 37 times more likely to generate a correct gesture than to 
give any other type of response. These findings indicate that children are indeed able to 
generate their own iconic gestures in order to communicate; and that they understand 
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the representational nature of iconic gestures, and use this in their own generation of 
iconic gestures.  
5.1.3 Generating pretend actions using object substitution (Chapter 4) 
 Previous studies on children’s ability to generate pretend actions are limited in 
that they cannot rule out the possibility that children used imitation or specific prompts 
to guide their pretend behaviour. Study 1 showed that 3- and 4-year-olds are indeed 
able to generate object substitution actions without the help of others. In addition, 
children distinguished between the intentions of an experimenter when showing object 
substitution actions, in which the experimenter had the intention to do a ‘wrong’ action; 
or showing trying actions, in which the experimenter had the intention to do a genuine 
action. Children mainly imitated the experimenter after object substitution actions, 
while correcting the trying actions. When the experimenter no longer modelled an 
action, children were more likely to generate novel object substitution actions after 
pretend trials than after trying trials. Children did require explicit instructions to pretend 
(e.g., “Now can you pretend?”) before they were able to generate these novel object 
substitution actions. However, these instructions did not include giving children specific 
prompts as to which pretend actions they should perform. 
 Study 2 further investigated the influence of divergent thinking and inhibitory 
control on the ability to generate object substitution actions. For both factors no 
relationship was found with children’s ability to generate object substitution actions in 
an experimental setting, nor with the amount of object substitution shown in a free play 
setting. In addition, children’s responses during the experiment and the free play setting 
were unrelated. This suggests that divergent thinking and inhibitory control might not 
be required for all types of pretend play, and that one must be cautious to interpret 
experimental results as reflective of children’s behaviour in naturalistic settings. 
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5.2 Generation of novel actions 
5.2.1 Creating variation 
Our findings indicate that children are able to generate novel actions from an 
early age. They were shown to generate actions with novel objects from 2 years, novel 
pretend actions from 3 years, and novel iconic gestures from 3.5 years. No floor effects 
were found in any of these studies indicating that children in all the age groups that 
were studied were able to generate these novel actions. Therefore, it is possible that 
even younger children are able to generate novel actions. Future research should 
replicate these findings in younger age groups and aim to establish when children start 
to generate their own actions. 
The findings endorse the idea that children are not restricted to imitating the 
behaviour of others (social learning) but also use their own exploration skills and 
knowledge to generate actions. It also suggests that the ability to create variation is 
already available at a very young age. This is an interesting finding because it validates 
ideas from cultural evolution theory, that the ability to generate variation is an 
important ability for the survival of our species (Mesoudi, Whiten, & Laland, 2004). 
Further research on even younger children and comparative research with primates 
could give us a more decisive indication as to whether the ability to generate variation 
is innate and/or whether certain environmental factors play a role in children’s ability to 
generate variation. 
Social learning and individual learning are both argued to be important for the 
evolution of our knowledge, ideas, and technology; also known as cultural traits 
(Mesoudi et al., 2004). The experimental designs in Chapter 3 and 4 used a 
combination of social and individual learning to show children’s ability to generate 
novel actions. Social learning through modelling was thought to be the best way to 
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make children familiar with the task and to show them the goal of the study without 
telling them specifically what to do. It was found that children indeed generated novel 
representational actions after similar actions were modelled by an adult. This finding 
provides an interesting opportunity for both parents and teachers if they want to 
encourage children to practice their representational skills. The procedures  used in 
Chapter 3 to model iconic gestures and Chapter 4 to model object substitution actions 
could form a basis for developing a game-like structure to practice these skills. 
Unlike other studies which investigated children’s ability to generate 
representational actions (e.g., Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Rakoczy, Tomasello, & 
Striano, 2004; Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006), we never reinforced correct responses or 
discouraged incorrect responses. Therefore, the information gained from social learning 
was completely child-driven. Our results showed that children learned the goal of the 
task through social learning. In addition, they were able to extend this goal to 
consecutive trials, thereby using what they learned through social learning to generate 
their own novel actions. This reinforces the ideas posed by social learning theories, 
such as Vygotsky’s dialectical theory (Vygotsky, 1934) and pedagogy theory (Csibra 
and Gergely, 2006), that children learn new things through the observation of other 
people’s behaviour.  In addition, the results in Chapter 4 showed that children were 
more likely to generate novel actions when given explicit instructions to do so. This 
further suggests that social interaction can help children to generate new behaviours. 
Our findings demonstrate how social and individual learning can be used in 
combination to generate novel actions. The same is likely the case for creating variation 
in cultural traits. Social learning is thought to provide children with a working platform 
on which they can build their individual exploration and generation of novel actions. 
This is in line with Piaget’s theory of cognitive development (Piaget, 1952) and the 
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experiential learning theory (Kolb, 1984), which pose that ideas are formed and 
transformed based on previous experiences or cognitive frameworks. It also suggests 
that to get a complete picture of how variation is created and used to initiate cultural 
evolution, social and individual learning are best investigated together rather than as 
separate mechanisms. 
5.2.2 Selective imitation 
The findings from Chapter 3 and 4 indicate that children generated novel actions 
without the help of a model or specific prompts to tell them what action to perform. 
This eliminates the possibility that children’s generation of novel actions as shown in 
other studies are solely due to imitation (e.g., Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Rakoczy et 
al., 2004) or specific prompts to tell them what to do (e.g., Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; 
Rakoczy et al., 2004; Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006). It suggests that children are indeed 
able to generate novel actions by themselves, and have the cognitive abilities to 
represent other objects even when these objects are not physically available, either 
through iconic gestures or through object substitution. 
The data from Chapter 4 further suggest that children do not blindly copy any 
actions modelled by an experimenter. If children were to over-imitate during the object 
substitution task, they would have been expected to imitate the mistake actions during 
the Trying Condition. However, children were shown to correct the experimenter by 
showing the real action performed with that object. Similar findings were reported by 
Rakoczy et al. (2004) when using auto symbolic pretend actions. This indicates that 
children take into account the intentions of the experimenter and selectively imitate the 
actions that the experimenter intended to perform, while ignoring the unintentional 
actions. 
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The observation that children do not just rely on imitation or other social 
interactions in order to learn new things, but also explore new things on their own, is 
important. It can have significant implications for how parents perceive their role in 
their children’s learning. As stated before in this chapter, the importance of social 
learning in the acquisition of new knowledge is evident. However, it is important to 
paint the whole picture and also emphasise individual learning, as this provides a more 
realistic view of how important the parents’ direct influence is in a child’s learning. 
Children also learn new things without their parents always being there to guide them. 
Rather than just focussing on modelling behaviour, our findings suggest that it can also 
be beneficial for children if parents give them their own space to explore for 
themselves.  
5.2.3 Communication 
Previous research has indicated that the most common ways of communicating 
for children is through speech and pointing (Özçalişkan & Goldin-Meadow, 2011). 
Gestures are mainly used to clarify aspects that are harder to verbalize (Campana, 
Silverman, Tanenhaus, & Benetto, 2004). Our study showed that, when talking and 
pointing are altogether impossible to use as means of communication, children do 
indeed switch to using iconic gestures in order to communicate. Although these 
findings display children’s ability to switch to a different communication means, one 
must be cautious to interpret this as reflecting children’s natural behaviour. In our 
experiment, an experimenter modelled beforehand how iconic gestures could be used in 
order to request the desired object. This might have given them the insight that using 
iconic gestures was a good alternative. However, we cannot say for sure whether 
children would have had this insight if the experimenter had not modelled the 
behaviour. This again reinforces the idea that social learning can provide an important 
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framework for children when generating new behaviour. Future research could 
investigate whether children naturally switch to generating iconic gestures when speech 
and pointing are ineffective. In accordance with the study described in Chapter 3, 
speech and pointing should be ineffective responses since children are expected to use 
these means of communication before switching to gestures. 
Poggi (2008) argued that in order to generate iconic gestures we select the 
features to imitate based on their distinctiveness and their ease to be represented by 
hands. The same is possibly the case for object substitution actions, although in this 
case it is also important to take the goal of the action into account. For iconic gestures, 
the main goal is thought to be to communicate to other people. Therefore it is most 
efficient to take the most distinctive features of an object to represent in the gesture. 
However, the goal of an object substitution action is not necessarily to communicate to 
others. When a child plays on his/her own and is not interested in whether other people 
understand what the substituted object is, it does not seem to matter how distinctive the 
action is, as long as the child knows and remembers what the object is supposed to be. 
However, when playing with others, it does seem important for the other person to 
understand the object substitution actions. Therefore, it is theorized that the child would 
make more distinctive object substitution actions when playing with someone else, 
compared to solitary pretend play. It would be interesting to investigate this further by 
comparing the object substitution actions of children during joint and solitary pretend 
play. 
5.2.4 Theoretical model for generating novel actions 
A new theoretical model to explain how children generate novel actions is 
proposed, which is displayed in Figure 1. The model was inspired by Piaget’s theory of 
cognitive development and the experiential learning theory, as it is based on the idea 
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that children use previous knowledge and build upon this knowledge to guide their 
generation of novel actions. It also takes into account claims made by Vygotsky’s 
dialectical theory and pedagogy theory, that social learning is an important initiator of 
learning new knowledge.  
 
 Figure 1: Proposed theoretical model displaying how children generate novel actions. 
 
According to the model, children initially learn what actions on objects are 
possible through observation (social learning) and/or accidental exploration. Accidental 
exploration relates to any action a child performs on an object without the intention to 
explore. For example, when a child accidentally drops a ball on the floor and it bounces 
back, the child has learned something about what the ball can do without necessarily 
having intended to explore this option. Through accidental exploration and social 
learning children build a repertoire of what actions can be performed with each object. 
Replication of actions within their repertoire strengthens their understanding of these 
object actions, but does not add any new information. 
Children’s generation of novel actions through child-directed learning is thought 
to be based on the current knowledge they possess about object actions. That is, the 
actions within their repertoire are applied to new situations without the original object. 
It is this final stage which is applicable to the studies in this thesis as well. When given 
a novel object (Chapter 2), children are theorized to use their previous knowledge of 
Chapter 5: General Discussion 
______________________________________________________________________   
155 
 
other objects to guide their exploration of the novel object. This suggests that children’s 
exploration is more structured than solely through trial-and-error based learning, in 
which children would randomly act on the object without any expectation of what 
might happen. Instead it is theorized that children use similarities between a familiar 
and the novel object, for example in shape or texture, to guide their exploration. By 
using this strategy, the number of possible actions is decreased and, because it is based 
on what actions are possible with similar objects, it increases the likelihood that the 
action is feasible. As an example, the spatula used as a novel object in Chapter 2 
showed similarities in texture (hard), and shape (a stick with a broad part on top) with a 
hammer. Children might have recognized these similarities and in response used more 
hammer-like actions (e.g., hitting parts of the Unusual Box).  
On the other hand, children were not limited in their exploration of novel objects 
when it resembled a familiar object. For example, the egg cup was recognized as such 
by a number of children. However, instead of limiting themselves to using it only as an 
egg cup (e.g., asking for an egg to put in or placing it on the table), children also 
explored the other features it contained, most noticeably the spiral shape which made it 
possible to pull the egg cup apart or squeeze it together. This shows that they still 
explored the further possible actions of that object, possibly by linking it to other 
objects with similar features (e.g., other objects with a spiral shape). 
The idea that children’s generation of novel actions is driven by their knowledge 
of actions with other objects is thought to be a structured and efficient way of 
generating novel actions. It filters out the number of initial possibilities by focusing on 
the most likely actions associated with the novel object. If in return the affordances of 
the familiar object do not match with the affordances of the novel object (e.g., it was 
not possible to hit things with the spatula after all), one can adjust the actions performed 
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with the novel object and try other actions instead. Future research is required to give a 
more definitive answer to what strategies children use to explore novel objects. One 
possible experiment to investigate how much children’s actions are guided by the 
physical similarities between the novel object and familiar objects could involve 
presenting children with a novel object that is physically very similar to a familiar 
object and other novel objects that are of decreasing similarity. If children rely on the 
physical similarities between the novel object and familiar objects, it is expected that 
the child would perform more actions alike actions performed with the familiar object 
when the novel object is physically very similar to the familiar object. 
When generating iconic gestures (Chapter 3), children are thought to use their 
knowledge of what actions are normally performed with an object and perform the most 
typical action in the absence of the object (Poggi, 2008). Children still seem quite 
flexible in generating the iconic gestures, because they show body part gestures as well 
as representational gestures. Body part gestures require children to use a part of their 
hand as if it was the object (e.g., using a finger as if it is a toothbrush, by moving the 
extended finger over the teeth). Therefore the action they perform as an iconic gesture 
is different than the action they would normally perform when the object was present. 
The cognitive processes used when generating body part gestures are thought to 
resemble the processes when generating object substitution actions. During object 
substitution actions one object is used as if it was another object. Similarly, when 
generating a body part gesture children substitute their own hand for another object. 
When generating object substitution actions (Chapter 4), we need to take into 
account children’s understanding of two objects. First, children may (or may not) have 
knowledge or beliefs about what actions are possible with the object in hand. Second, 
children need to have an understanding of the possible actions with the substituted 
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object in order to know what action to perform if they wanted to pretend that the object 
in hand was like the substituted object. Crucially, children would then need to suppress 
the actions normally performed with the object in hand and temporarily act upon the 
object as if it were the substituted object.  
5.3 Individual differences 
Our findings indicate that children as young as 2 years are able to generate novel 
actions. However, some children were found to be better at generating these actions 
than other children. These individual differences suggest that some children may be 
better skilled at generating novel ideas than others. This has important implications for 
the implementation of learning strategies within the education system. With the current 
emphasis on child-directed learning (The Department for Education, 2012) our results 
suggest that some children would benefit more from an individual learning strategy, in 
which they are given objects or learning content to explore on their own. On the other 
hand, children who do not seem to explore as much on their own might benefit more 
from a social learning strategy, in which a teacher guides the learning experience of the 
child by showing him/her new behaviours or emphasising certain aspects of the learning 
content. 
The results from the studies described in this thesis cannot explain how these 
individual differences come about. The positive relationship between age and children’s 
ability to generate multiple actions for novel objects (Chapter 2) suggests that children’s 
ability to generate novel actions might improve with increasing age. Although this 
suggests that the ability to generate novel actions is a flexible trait, longitudinal studies 
are required to provide a clearer picture of how age affects the ability to generate novel 
actions within the same person. 
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Cognitive skills that were expected to influence children’s ability to generate 
novel actions were divergent thinking and inhibitory control. Divergent thinking was 
positively correlated to the number of different actions children generated with novel 
objects. This indicates that, when no restrictions are given in what an object could be or 
what actions can be performed with it, children with higher divergent thinking scores 
generate more novel actions. However, divergent thinking scores had no effect on 
children’s ability to substitute one object for another. In Chapter 4 this was argued to be 
because the pictures presented might have guided them to generate a specific action, 
therefore divergent thinking skills were not required. This suggests that divergent 
thinking might still be useful for generating object substitution actions when a child can 
use object substitution without restrictions. Although children’s divergent thinking 
skills were initially not related to the number of object substitution actions performed 
during free play, exploratory analyses revealed that for children who performed at least 
one object substitution action, originality scores and the number of object substitution 
actions performed were positively correlated. It was argued that children might be 
guided in their play by functionally specific objects that are available, but that divergent 
thinking skills are relevant when no structure is given. This suggests that when parents 
or teachers want to encourage exploration and individual learning, this may work best 
in a free setting rather than in a structured game. Future research is needed however to 
investigate this relationship further. 
Inhibitory control was hypothesized to be specifically important for children’s 
ability to generate object substitution actions. During object substitution, children 
needed to temporarily inhibit the original action performed with that object in order to 
generate the object substitution object. However, children’s inhibitory control and their 
ability to generate objects substitution actions, both in an experimental and naturalistic 
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setting, were unrelated. This contradicts earlier findings which do indicate a 
relationship between inhibitory control and pretend play behaviour (e.g., Kelly, 
Dissanayake, Hammond, & Ihsen, 2011). In Chapter 3, the observation was already 
made that half of the children failed the practice trials. This means that even directly 
after being given the instructions of what word to say after which picture, children 
failed to answer correctly. This could indicate that the children assessed had generally 
low inhibitory control, resulting in a floor effect for half of the sample. Another 
alternative is that children had difficulty understanding the task. Gerstadt, Hong, and 
Diamond (1994) also observed that a large number of children failed to pass the 
practice trials. If 3-year-olds have difficulty understanding the task it might not be 
completely reflective of their inhibitory control skills. Although this measure was 
chosen intentionally because it required a child to inhibit one response and instead give 
an alternative response, similar to what is required when generating object substitution 
actions, it is worthwhile assessing inhibitory control skills with alternative measures to 
give a more decisive indication of the relationship between inhibitory control and the 
ability to generate novel actions.  
It would be interesting to investigate other executive function skills as well. 
Working memory relates to our capacity to maintain and manipulate information 
(Baddeley, 1992). In adults, increased working memory has been linked to increased 
divergent thinking (e.g., De Dreu, Nijstad, Baas, Wolsink, & Roskes, 2012; Roskos-
Ewoldsen, Black, & McCown, 2008), which was related to children’s ability to generate 
novel actions in this thesis. It is theorized that as one can maintain and manipulate more 
pieces of information, one has a greater capacity to generate combinations of actions as 
well as actions of greater complexity. Future research could investigate whether this 
relationship can already be found in children. Another executive function skill that 
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would be interesting to explore is cognitive flexibility. Cognitive flexibility is defined 
as the ability to alter a behavioural response mode in the face of changing contingencies 
(Monchi, Petrides, Petre, Worsley, & Dagher, 2001); i.e., switching one’s behaviour 
when task demands change. It is commonly assessed using the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
task (e.g., Kaland, Smith, & Mortensen, 2008; Memari et al., 2013; Ni, Huang, & Guo, 
2011) and to a lesser extend the Trail making task (e.g., Kortte, Horner, & Windham, 
2002; Longo, Kerr, & Smith, 2013). Cognitive flexibility is thought to be important for 
generating novel actions as well, especially for actions like object substitution. It 
requires children to switch from the original use of an object to the substituted action. In 
adults, cognitive flexibility has been linked to divergent thinking as well (e.g., Zabelina 
& Robinson, 2010). Future research could look specifically into the relationship 
between children’s cognitive flexibility and generating novel actions. 
In addition to intrinsic factors that could have an effect on children’s ability to 
generate novel actions, it would be interesting to investigate extrinsic factors as well. 
One such factor could be parenting styles. Parenting styles relate to the way in which 
parents guide their children’s behaviour (e.g., through warmth, involvement, maturity 
demands, and supervision; Glasgow, Dornbush, Troyer, Steinberg, & Ritter, 1997). A 
permissive parenting style is associated with child-directed learning in which the child 
is allowed independence to explore (Baumrind, 1971). On the other hand, parents with 
an authoritarian parenting style dictate what their children should and should not do 
(Baumrind, 1971). Previous research suggests that children of parents with an 
authoritarian parenting style are less creative than children of parents with a permissive 
parenting style (e.g., Fearon, Copeland, & Saxon, 2013; Miller, Lambert, & Speirs 
Neumeister, 2012). It seems likely that children who are allowed to explore would be 
better able to generate novel actions than children who are mainly being told what to 
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do. If parenting styles do affect children’s ability to generate novel actions this could 
give opportunities to try and improve this ability by educating parents about the impact 
their parenting style has on the cognitive abilities of their child, or giving them training 
to change their parenting style. 
5.3.1 Application of findings to Artificial Intelligence and robotics 
research 
In the general discussion of Chapter 2, the application of our findings to 
artificial intelligence and robotics research was briefly discussed. The Unusual Box test 
was initially developed with the purpose to assess children’s ability to generate novel 
actions. However, the same test could also be used in artificial intelligence and robotics 
research, to develop computational models that represent how children generate new 
actions, and investigate a wide array of factors that could affect individual learning. The 
test provides an easy tool to assess individual learning, and requires limited cognitive 
and linguistic demands. 
In the development of computational models that represent how children 
generate new actions, two recommendations are made based on the findings in this 
thesis. First, computational models should take into account the finding that some 
children rely more on individual learning than others. As we found differences in the 
number of actions produced between children, a computational model developed to 
model the generation of new actions should produce similar outcomes. This means that 
the predicted behaviour should show a spread in the number of actions generated. 
Second, computational models should take into account how likely it is that an 
individual action is performed. In this thesis we found that some actions were 
performed more often than other actions. In Chapter 2, some actions were generated by 
more than 50% of the children while other actions were only performed by a single 
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child. Similarly, in Chapter 3 it was found that when representing some of the objects 
all children performed one specific type of gesture, while for other objects children used 
a variety of gesture types. This suggests that some actions are more likely to occur than 
other actions. Computational models should make use of this information, for example 
by feeding the action frequencies found in our study directly into a computer 
programme that guides a robot’s behaviour. Based on our findings, we cannot say 
conclusively why these differences occur. The theoretical model described in paragraph 
5.2.4 suggests that children are guided in the generation of novel actions by their 
previous knowledge of other objects. If this is correct, an unequal distribution of action 
types is expected based on the resemblance of the object at hand in comparison to the 
experience with previous objects. We suggest using the theoretical model described to 
develop new computational models and compare the outcome from computer 
simulations or robot behaviour to validate or invalidate the theoretical model. 
5.4 Conclusions 
 The main aim of this thesis was to provide a general investigation of children’s 
ability to generate novel actions. Three different settings were used to offer a varied 
investigation of this ability. The findings indicate that children as young as 2 years have 
the ability to generate multiple actions with novel objects. In addition, 3-year-olds 
displayed the ability to generate iconic gestures and object substitution actions. These 
findings are an important addition to the current knowledge about children’s action 
production, by showing that children indeed generate these actions be themselves, and 
do not only rely on direct imitation of other’s behaviour or specific prompts to tell them 
what to do. It also strengthens the idea that children from a young age are able to create 
new ideas, which is an important skill to have in order to be able to adapt to changing 
circumstances. Whether it is possible to increase children’s ability to generate novel 
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ideas; through education, parental influences, or specific training; remains an important 
question to be answered in future research. 
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Appendix A 
Object Locations and Actions 
Object Locations 
Round Hole 
Rectangular Room 
Stairs 
Blocks 
Rings 
Strings 
Edge of the Box 
Side of the Box 
Whole Box 
No Box 
 
Actions Description 
Jump Within a two-second period of time and for two or more times 
in a row, the object is placed on (part of) the box, then lifted in 
the air higher than needed for walking. During the placing of the 
object, it is kept hold of. 
Walk Within a two-second period of time and for two or more times 
in a row, the object is placed on (part of) the box. During the 
placing of the object, it is kept hold of. 
Hit The object hits the box. 
Touch The object touches the box. 
Roll The object is rolled over the surface of the box, either holding it 
or letting it go. 
Turn The object is turned around. 
Drop The object is held above the place where it will land, and then 
let go. 
Guide through While holding the object it is guided through (part of) the box 
without stopping. 
Hold in place The object is placed on (part of) the box. During the placing of 
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the object it is kept hold of. 
Place The object is placed on part of the box and let go so that it 
stands on its own for a while. 
Move over While holding the object, it is guided on part of the box and then 
moved over its surface. 
Pull (Part of) the box/object is pulled toward the participant. 
Push (Part of) the box/object is pushed away from the participant. 
Squeeze The object is squeezed, using thumb and index finger. 
Cover Part of the box is covered by the object. 
Throw against The object is thrown against the box. 
Hang The object is attached to the box (e.g., by manipulating the 
object) and let go so that it hangs on the box. 
Shake The object is held in the hand(s) and moved quickly from one 
side to the other. 
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Appendix B 
Items used for the Pattern Meanings subtest 
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Appendix C 
Object Pairs 
Model Trials 
Easy Pairs Difficult Pair 
Glasses Microphone Toothbrush Lipstick 
Xylophone Tissue   
 
Extension Trials 
Easy Pairs Difficult Pairs 
Drum Cup Drum Ball 
Ball Spoon Cup Spoon 
Hammer Harmonica Hammer Shaker 
Shaker  Whistle Harmonica Whistle 
Pen Hairbrush Pen Paintbrush 
Paintbrush Hat Hairbrush Hat 
Glove Watering Can Glove Soap 
Soap Shovel Watering Can Shovel 
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Appendix D 
Order of object pairs used in the Test Phase of the pretend experiments in Studies 1 and 2 
Order 1 
Phase Object Presented Other Picture 
Model Ball Cup 
 Piano Camera 
 Hat Glove 
 Toothbrush Whistle 
Extension Hammer Brush 
 Shaker Pen 
 Soap Glasses 
 Phone Drum 
 
 
Order 2 
Phase Object Presented Other Picture 
Model Hammer Brush 
 Shaker Pen 
 Soap Glasses 
 Phone Drum 
Extension Ball Cup 
 Piano Camera 
 Hat Glove 
 Toothbrush Whistle 
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Order 3 
Phase Object Presented Other Picture 
Model Cup Ball 
 Camera  Piano 
 Glove Hat 
 Whistle Toothbrush 
Extension Brush Hammer 
 Pen Shaker 
 Glasses Soap 
 Drum Phone 
 
 
Order 4 
Phase Object Presented Other picture 
Model Brush Hammer 
 Pen Shaker 
 Glasses Soap 
 Drum Phone 
Extension Cup Ball 
 Camera Piano 
 Glove Hat 
 Whistle Toothbrush 
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Appendix E 
Pictures of objects used in the pretend experiments in Studies 1 and 2 
Familiarization Phase: 
  
Test Phase: 
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Appendix F 
Actions performed on each object, and sounds effects made in the Pretend Condition 
(for both the Implicit and Explicit Group) 
Object 
Presented 
Target 
Object 
Action
1 
Sound Effects 
Pretending 
Ball Cup Holding the ball in a way you would 
normally hold a cup and bringing the 
ball to the mouth, pretending to drink 
from it. 
Slurping sound – 
as if drinking 
from a cup 
Cup Ball Taking the cup in two hands and 
holding it a bit above the table, in a 
way you would normally hold a ball 
before bouncing it. Then bouncing 
the cup on the table while making 
sound effects. 
“Boing Boing” – 
as if bouncing a 
ball 
Piano Camera Holding the piano with two hands on 
each side, in a way you would 
normally hold a camera. Bringing the 
piano to the eye, as if looking 
through the viewfinder. Then 
pressing with one finger on top of the 
piano, as if taking a picture. 
“Click click” 
Camera Piano Placing the camera flat on the table, 
then moving hands from left to right 
over the camera, while moving 
fingers as if playing piano. 
Singing melody 
as if playing a 
tune 
Hat Glove Holding the hat in one hand, while 
holding the other hand above the 
table with fingers spread. Sliding the 
hat over her hand from fingers to 
wrist, then letting go of the hat and 
looking at the hat on her hand. 
“Ohhhh” – as if 
admiring how 
pretty the glove is 
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Glove Hat Picking up the glove with two hands, 
in a way you would normally hold a 
hat. Placing the glove on top of her 
head, and holding hands to the side 
as if showing off the hat 
“Ohhhh” – as if 
admiring how 
pretty the hat is 
Toothbrush Whistle Picking up the toothbrush with two 
hands, in a way you would normally 
hold a whistle (recorder). Bringing 
the toothbrush to the mouth and 
moving fingers as if playing. 
Singing melody 
as if playing a 
tune 
Whistle Toothbrush Bringing the whistle to a short 
distance in front of the mouth in a 
way you would normally hold a 
toothbrush. Opening mouth so that 
teeth are visible, then moving hand 
from left to right in front of teeth. 
“Shhh shhh shhh” 
– like the sound 
of the toothbrush 
on the teeth 
Hammer Brush Holding the hammer in one hand, in 
a way you would normally hold a 
hair brush. Bringing the hammer to 
the hair and moving hand up and 
down over the hair, as if brushing it.  
“Shh shh” – as 
the sound a hair 
brush makes 
when going 
through hair 
Brush Hammer Holding the brush with the bristles to 
the side, in a way you would 
normally hold a hammer. Banging 
the brush three times on the table. 
No sound effects, 
other than the 
banging sound of 
the brush 
Shaker Pen Holding the shaker in a way you 
would normally hold a pen. Making 
movements with the end of the 
shaker on the table as if she is 
writing. 
“Ohhhh” – as if 
admiring what 
she has written 
Pen Shaker Holding the pen with writing end 
firmly in one hand in a way you 
would normally hold a shaker. 
“Cha-cha” – as 
the sound a 
shaker makes 
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Shaking pen quickly on one side of 
the body, then moving hand to other 
side and making another shaking 
movement. 
when shaking it 
Soap Glasses Picking up the soap with two hands, 
one hand on each side. Bringing the 
soap to face on the top of the nose, 
covering the eyes. Moves head from 
left to right and back as if looking 
through glasses.  
“Ohhhh” – as if 
admiring the view 
she sees through 
the glasses 
 
Glasses 
 
Soap 
 
Holding the glasses (closed) in one 
hand. Moving other hand over the 
glasses, then placing it in the other 
hand and moving the spare hand over 
the glasses, as if washing hands with 
soap. 
 
“Lalala” – as if 
enjoying washing 
hands 
Phone Drum Placing the phone flat on the table, 
then hitting phone in turns with both 
hand on the phone. 
No sound effects, 
other than 
banging sound of 
the hands on the 
phone 
Drum Phone Taking the drum in one hand by the 
rim. With the other hand, using the 
index finger to hit the drum as if 
pressing buttons on a phone. Then 
bringing the drum to one ear. 
“Hello?” when 
bringing the drum 
to the ear 
1
Every action was repeated twice, with some pauses in which the experimenter looked at the object 
(Trying Condition) or at the child (Pretend Condition). 
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Appendix G 
Description of levels of behaviour and examples of children’s behaviour at each level. 
Based on the Exploratory Behaviour Scale by Van Schijndel, Franse, and Raijmakers 
(2012). 
Level 1: Passive contact 
A child touches, holds, or transports an object, without manipulating the object in an 
active or attentive manner. 
- A girl holds her hand on the xylophone, while talking to her mother. 
- A boy transports the dog stuffed animal from the tray to right in front of him. 
- A girl touches the shape sorter with her finger, without moving it or actively 
exploring the object. 
Level 2: Active manipulation 
A child manipulates an object in an active and attentive manner. This implies that the 
child pays attention to his or her action(s) and the outcomes of the action(s). 
- A boy hits the xylophone with the hammer. 
- A girl places blocks on top of each other, building a tower. 
- A boy pulls a red bendy stick on both sides so that it extends, then pushes on 
both sides so that it contracts. 
Level 3a: Clear pretending (Autosymbolic) 
A child uses an object in a way that is normally used, but he or she attributes features to 
the object which are not present, or pretends inanimate objects are animate. The 
pretend act can be accompanied by sound effects or words explaining the pretend 
setting. 
- A girl uses a sponge to wash the dog stuffed animal (no water present). 
- A boy pours imaginary tea from teapot into cup (no tea present). 
- A girl brings two puppets with their faces close together, and makes kissing 
sounds. 
Level 3b: Clear pretending (Object Substitution) 
A child uses an object as if it is something else. The pretend act can be accompanied by 
sound effects or words explaining the pretend setting. 
- A boy takes a red bendy stick and holds it in the cup while stirring it around in 
the cup like a spoon. 
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- A girl holds the blue, snakelike, sponge in one hand and pulls on the cord 
attached to the sponge with her other hand, while saying, “It is a catapult!” 
- A girl takes a puppet and places it near the blocks that are stacked like a house, 
while saying, “This is the girl’s house.”
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